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African Transitional Justice Research Project: Case Study on 
Transitional Justice in Nigeria 
 INTRODUCTION 
Nigeria, a multi-religious and ethnically diverse country with over 350 ethnicities,1 
typifies the legacy of British colonialism in sub-Saharan Africa. Given this diversity, it is 
not unusual that conflict has belied the country’s transition to democracy, and 
transitional justice has attempted to be a mechanism through which this is achieved – 
even with challenges to its broader enforcement. This report draws on documents and 
interviews to analyse the implementation of transitional justice measures in Nigeria. It 
examines the current state of affairs regarding justice for the past and reform of 
institutions in the country.  
Nigeria as we know it today is a creation of British colonial rule from the amalgamation 
of the Northern and Southern Protectorates of Nigeria by Lord Frederick Lugard in 
1914. The peoples of the various kingdoms and empires in the territories now known as 
Nigeria first came into contact with Europeans from about 1450 through the trade of 
slaves, particularly with the Portuguese. The British arrived in 15392 but British 
colonial rule in Nigeria commenced with the annexation of Lagos as a Crown Colony in 
1861.3 Nigeria achieved independence from British colonial rule on 1 October 1960, 
making it one of the first countries to gain independence in West Africa. However, the 
                                                      
1 National Conference 2014: Final Draft of Conference Report (14 August 2014) 52 available at: 
http://www.premiumtimesng.com/national-conference/download-nigeria-2014-national-conference-
report-ngconfab-2/ (accessed 15 May 2017). 
2 Ralph Uwechue Reflections on the Nigerian Civil War: Facing the Future (Africana Publishing Corporation 
New York 1971) 3. 
3 A narrative of how the cession came about is provided in Attorney General of Southern Nigeria v John 
Holt and Company (Liverpool) Limited and Others [1915] A.C 1, 4-7. 
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country remained a Commonwealth realm with Queen Elizabeth II as the titular Head of 
State until 1 October 1963 when Nigeria became a republic, thereby cutting off the 
remaining direct tie to British authority.  
Post-independence, Nigeria’s substantial natural resources have not been translated 
into development for its teeming population. The country has had a severely chequered 
history of development and democratic governance, experienced a civil-war and nearly 
three decades of military rule. After many failed promises, the military eventually 
handed over power to an elected government on 29 May 1999 with the promulgation of 
a hurriedly produced and imposed Constitution. The transition to civil rule followed a 
period of strong and sometimes violent agitation. Ironically, the eventual civil transition 
programme was accidental at best, and was not negotiated between the civil populace 
and the military rulers. As a result, some have argued that the very legal basis of the 
political transition programme remains illegal as  
politicians campaigned for offices, participated in elections, were elected yet 
there was no grundnorm, there was no constitution. Elections had been 
conducted before the military government that was leaving power [had] 
promulgated a Constitution.4 
The country has continued to struggle with political and social instability and a shaky 
rule of law. Structural disequilibrium created by military authoritarian rule has 
remained the most contentious among a number of issues at the core of agitations for 
renegotiating the country’s federalism. Separatist agitations have returned to the front 
burner in the country. There have been recent calls for secession of the Eastern region 
                                                      
4 Interview with Nurudeen Ogbara (lawyer, human rights and democracy activist) former Executive 
Secretary of the National Association of Democratic Lawyers; former Chair, Nigeria Bar Association, 
Ikorodu Branch (Lagos State); Lagos, Nigeria, 4 April, 2017. See also Tunde I. Ogowewo ‘Why the Judicial 
Annulment of the Constitution of 1999 is Imperative to the Survival of Nigeria’s Democracy’ (2000) 44 
Journal of African Law 135. 
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by groups advocating for a return of the ‘Republic of Biafra’ and there are fears that 
these may lead to another round of violence and, or civil war.5 Demands for fiscal 
federalism, the control of proceeds from oil and gas and other natural resources like 
gold, uranium, coal and tin, have been a major source of contention.  
The democratic dispensation has been marked by serial violence and continuing 
impunity by state and non-state actors.6 To cite three recent examples: First, over 350 
members of the Islamic Movement of Nigeria (IMN) were believed to have been 
unlawfully killed by the military in a three day operation from 12 - 14 December 2015 
following a confrontation with soldiers in Zaria, Kaduna State, North Central Nigeria.7 
The IMN members, some of whom were armed with batons, knives, and machetes had 
refused to clear away from the road near their headquarters. The army alleged they 
attacked the convoy of the Chief of Army Staff in a bid to assassinate him. To cover up 
their actions, the soldiers carted away the bodies of the victims and buried them in 
shallow graves. Some of the corpses of victims were burnt. Three children of the leader 
of the group, Ibrahim Zakyzaky, were killed in a siege on his home by soldiers. 
Zakyzaky’s house as well as the group’s headquarters was levelled to the ground by 
soldiers. 100 members of the group were arrested and are on trial while the leader who 
was fatally injured, as well as his wife, has remained in detention without trial. No one 
has been brought to justice for the mass killings.8 Second is the case of the Jama’atu 
                                                      
5 Fisayo Soyombo ‘Is Nigeria on the Brink of Another Civil War? - On the 50th Anniversary of its Bloody 
Civil War, Nigeria is Struggling to Prevent Another’ Al-Jazeerah available at: 
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2017/07/nigeria-brink-civil-war-170712131405928.html 
(accessed 15 July 2017)  
6 Amnesty International Nigeria: Trapped in the Cycle of Violence (Amnesty International 2012); 
International Crisis Group Curbing Violence in Nigeria (I): The Jos Crisis (2012) Africa Report No.196 
7 Amnesty International ‘Nigeria: Military Cover-Up of Mass Slaughter Exposed’ (2016) Press Release 
https://www.amnesty.org/en/press-releases/2016/04/nigeria-military-cover-up-of-mass-slaughter-at-
zaria-exposed/ (accessed 07 July 2017). 
8 Amnesty International (2016). 
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Ahlus-Sunnah Lidda’Awati Wal Jihad, commonly known as Boko Haram (western 
education/civilisation is evil) involved in an insurgency in the country. In April 2014, 
the group drew international concern with the kidnapping of more than 270 school girls 
from a government secondary school for girls at Chibok, Borno State, North East Nigeria 
in May 2014. This was ostensibly in a bid to secure the release of detained Boko Haram 
members. The immediate cause of the recourse to arms and violence by the group was 
the unlawful killing of their leader, Mohammed Yusuf in July 2009 by the police 
following his arrest by the army in a peaceful protest organized by Boko Haram. 
Repeated demands for justice for his extra-judicial execution by the Police went 
unheeded. Hundreds of his supporters had also been killed at the time.9 The Boko 
Haram insurgency has been regarded by some as a manifestation of ‘Islamic’ 
fundamentalism. However, relevant stakeholders, local voices at, close to, or otherwise 
connected to the epicentre of the violence have maintained an alternative narrative. On 
this account, the violence is a product of social displacement and neglect, abject poverty 
and gross disenchantment with government by some elements from that least 
developed part of the country.10 As a concerned group recently observed  
The underlining narrative of Boko Haram is the offer of an alternative state that 
not only postulates to be theologically legitimate, but also seeks out the forgotten 
welfare of the people.11 
                                                      
9 Freedom Onuoha ‘Why Do Youth Join Boko Haram?’ (2014) United States Institute for Peace Special 
Report #348 1-12. 
10 Onuoha ibid. For analyses of the Boko Haram insurgency, see Andrew Walker ‘What Is Boko Haram?’ 
(2012) United States Institute for Peace Special Report #308; Azeez Olaniyan and Lucky Asuelime ‘Boko 
Haram Insurgency and the Widening of Cleavages in Nigeria’ (2014) 7 (2) African Security 91-109; Oarhe 
Osumah ‘Boko Haram Insurgency in Northern Nigeria and the Vicious Cycle of Internal Insecurity’ (2013) 
23 (3) Small Wars and Insurgencies 536-560. 
11 Samuel Ogundipe ‘How to End Poverty, Illiteracy, Other Crisis in Northern Nigeria — Sultan, Onaiyekan, 
Jega, Others’  Premium Times (02 August 2017 Abuja) 
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In the southern part of the country, militant groups in the Niger Delta had previously 
attracted international attention with violence there - mainly in the form of bombing oil 
installations, attacks on state security agents and kidnapping of local and expatriate oil 
workers - impacting on world oil prices. The violence in the Niger Delta is closely linked 
to agitations by some groups for local control or a better share of the oil revenue which 
is the mainstay of the country’s economy in the face of socio-economic and 
infrastructural neglect, and a despoiled environment.  
Significantly, notwithstanding political transition to civil rule, the military (and military 
elites) has continued in power in democratic Nigeria. The military’s continuing hold on 
power has been a major factor that underwrites the neutralisation of meaningful 
attempts at transitional justice and institutional reform in the country. The 
entrenchment of the military old-guard and their acolytes has become a critical dynamic 
that defines the interests and priorities of the political elite, and transitional justice is 
not one of these priorities. If anything, the political elite consider transitional justice as 
threat to their power.  
With the benefit of deep-pockets deriving from corruption, rent-seeking and nepotism 
established during three decades in power, the military has maintained a system of 
gate-keeping in the post-authoritarian period. A major indicator of this is that in 
seventeen years of the post-authoritarian period, Nigeria has been ruled by either a 
former military ruler or their anointed candidate. Indeed, the political transition to 
civilian rule was an exercise in which a military Head of State (General Abdusalami 
Abubakar) in khaki handed over power to an elected, retired former military Head of 
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State (retired General Olusegun Obasanjo) in agbada, as President.12 Former military 
men who held political positions emerged as State governors, members of the upper 
and lower houses of Parliament and even head of the upper house of Parliament (the 
Senate). Further, former and serving senior military rulers have either been installed 
traditional rulers (especially in the Northern part of the country, including the two 
highest such positions in the former Sokoto Caliphate) or played decisive roles in 
determining who gets appointed.  
The report proceeds as follows. The first part examines the historical context. This 
includes a focus on the legacies of colonisation on the transitional justice landscape in 
the country. The colonial legacy of unaddressed impunity played a major role in shaping 
transitional justice in the country. The inception of military rule followed closely on the 
heels of the end of colonial rule. A civil war erupted in Southern Nigeria during the early 
days of the period of military rule, and would continue to define Nigeria’s political 
history into the 21st century. Part two focuses on the political transition from 
authoritarian military rule to a democratic dispensation after three decades under 
military leadership. The discussion is mainly concerned with the nature of the 
transitional justice measures introduced as part of political change in the country in 
1999. The truth-seeking process embodied by the Human Rights Violations 
Investigation Commission13 (Oputa Panel)14  is central to this, but the discussion also 
considers the limited lustration of a number of erstwhile military officers as well as few 
                                                      
12 Khaki is the colloquial term for the military uniform; Agbada is men’s free-flowing traditional wear 
worn in most parts of the country and favoured especially for ceremonial occasions but also commonly 
worn by the political class. 
13 This is the official title adopted by the body and under which its report was submitted. Initially styled 
‘The Human Rights Investigation Panel’, it was later renamed ‘The Judicial Commission for the 
Investigation of Human Rights Violations in Nigeria’.   
14 So named after the chairman. See Hakeem O. Yusuf ‘Travails of Truth: Achieving Justice for Victims of 
Impunity in Nigeria’ (2007) 1 (2) International Journal of Transitional Justice 268 
Page 8 of 85 
 
 
prosecutions of some key members of the notorious Abacha military regime (1993-
1998).  The Oputa Panel did a commendable and largely well-received job. However, 
while the work of the Panel assisted the bid to legitimise the post-authoritarian civilian 
administration, any other successes recorded by the process were overshadowed by the 
failure of the Obasanjo administration to implement its recommendations. Part three 
analyses the aftermath of the Oputa Panel, the ensuing governance gap, the dilemma of 
unreformed institutions and continuing impunity in the country. Part four evaluates the 
current state of transitional justice and is then followed by the conclusion.  
HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
The Colonial Legacy and Early Phase of Nationhood 
During the colonial period, the British did not attempt to bridge the ethnic divides 
existing in the country.15 Rather, the British practiced a system of ‘indirect rule’ which 
promoted and increased the existing differences.16 An important legacy of colonial rule 
was the organisation of government along ethnic lines, using existing or manipulated 
traditional leadership structures in the three regions: Northern, Eastern and Western17 
dominated by the Hausa-Fulani, Ibo (or Igbo) and Yoruba respectively. The regional 
structure meant that at independence, the ‘strong desires’ of the other ethnic groups for 
‘self-determination’ were either not properly recognised or sufficiently addressed. 
                                                      
15 Daniel E. Agbiboa ‘Ethno-Religious Conflicts and the Elusive Quest for National Identity in Nigeria’ 
(2012) 44 (1) Journal of Black Studies 3-30, 13-16; Pade Badru ‘Ethnic Conflict and State Formation in 
Post-Colonial Africa: A Comparative Study of Ethnic Genocide in the Congo, Liberia, Nigeria and Rwanda-
Burundu (2010) 27 (2) Journal of Third World Studies 149, 159. 
16 Samson C. Ukpabi ‘Nigeria: The Issues of War and Peace’ in Tekena N. Tamuno and Samson C. Ukpabi 
(eds.) Nigeria Since Independence- The First 25 Years: The Civil War Years (Vol. 7 Heinemann Educational 
Books (Nigeria) Ltd 1989), 107-124, 110. 
17 They became four with the creation of the Mid-Western region in 1963. 
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Consequently, the ‘arbitrary grouping’ was a ‘major cause of instability’ in the country.18 
Efforts to manage the unstable arrangements bequeathed by colonial rule in this regard 
have included the gradual creation of sub-national units (States) which now number 36, 
the constitutionalisation (since 1979) of a federal character principle for national 
integration19 including a provision in the 1999 Constitution that a Minister must be 
appointed from each of the States as well as an informal recognition of six geo-political 
zones. Significantly, however, the country has continued to be challenged by the 
absence of a national identity with ethnic strife simmering throughout the period of 
military rule.20  
Federalism in Nigeria is generally viewed as an expedient choice to accommodate 
diverse groups with distinct ethnic-identities, language, culture, religion, and even 
geographical locations brought together under British colonial rule.21 The principle was 
introduced by the British in 1946 through the Richard’s Constitution following the 
demands of the nationalist leaders22 though it was formally put into practice only 
through the 1954 Constitution.23 In this regard, it has been argued that the  
uneven modernisation and differential administration of the protectorates under 
colonial rule (coupled with the artificial boundaries), engendered strong 
                                                      
18 ‘Statement at a Press Conference on the Nigerian Crisis in the Connaught Rooms, Kingsway, London, on 
Monday July 17, 1967 by Chief Anthony Enahoro, Nigerian Federal Commissioner of Information and 
Labour’ reproduced in Tamuno and Ukpabi (1989), ‘Appendix to Chapter One’; 42-48, 43. 
19 This requires ethnic spread and States’ representation in the composition of the Federal Government 
and federal bodies As provided in Section 14 (3) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 
1999. Similar provisions are made in respect of the States, Section 14 (4); see for a discussion Ladipo 
Adamolekun, John Erero and Basil Oshionebo ‘“Federal Character” and Management of the Federal Civil 
Service and the Military’ (1991) 21 (4) Publius: 75-88. 
20  
21 Ladipo Adamolekun and S. Bamidele Ayo (1989) ‘The Evolution of the Nigerian Federal Administration 
System’ 19 (1) Publius: 157, 157. 
22 National Conference 2014: Final Draft of Conference Report  (14 August 2014) 6 available at: 
http://www.premiumtimesng.com/national-conference/download-nigeria-2014-national-conference-
report-ngconfab-2/  
23 Akintunde O. Obilade Nigerian Legal System (Spectrum Law Publishing Ibadan 1990) 33. 
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regionalist pressures for the introduction of full-fledged federalism to replace 
the unitary (albeit decentralised) colonial administration.24  
The country’s experience of the application of fundamental principles of federalism has 
been affected by the political experience of three decades of military authoritarianism. 
In principle, successive military regimes in the country maintained the federal political 
system, no doubt to assuage feelings of alienation and reduce potential antagonism to 
its imposed rule. However, the command-structure style of governance did not 
accommodate agitations for political restructuring of the country. The military 
governors ‘were more like military prefects in a French-style provincial administration 
than leaders of sub-national units with any meaningful autonomy.’25 Many interest 
groups were unhappy with the situation but felt disempowered by military 
authoritarianism to challenge this.  
By the time the country returned to civil rule, governance in the country had become 
over-centralized. A distorted federal system is one of the most problematic legacies of 
military rule and a continuing source of tensions and violence in the country. Oil wealth 
made the control of the centre (and the control it had acquired over oil resources) 
particularly attractive.26 Over time, the federal government accumulated so many 
powers that it dominates virtually every aspect of governance in the country including 
vital aspects of land matters within States, commerce and trade, weight and measures, 
social security, police and policing, arms and ammunition and labour. This is reflected in 
the statement of competencies of the levels of government in the legislative lists 
                                                      
24 Rian Leith and Hussein Solomon ‘On Ethnicity and Ethnic Conflict Management in Nigeria’ (2001) 
ACCORD http://www.accord.org.za/ajcr-issues/on-ethnicity-and-ethnic-conflict-management-in-nigeria/ 
(Accessed 04 July 2017). 
25 Adamolekun and Ayo (1989) 163. 
26 Jonas Isawa Elaigwu ‘Federalism in Nigeria’s New Democratic Polity’ (2002) 32 (2) Publius 73, 76. 
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contained in the Constitution. The 1999 Constitution assigned at least 66 broadly 
worded exclusive powers to the federal authorities. The exclusive powers are in 
addition to a concurrent (in practice, overriding) power, with the states, over 30 other 
items. This is a far cry from the position at independence. It is instructive in this regard 
for instance that the final act of British constitutional legislation in the country, the 
Nigerian (Constitution) Order in Council, 1960 enacted separate constitutions for the 
federal government and three regions.27 
Political analysts have identified the civil-war, the progressive unbundling of the three 
regions into States, the increased revenue derivable from oil, and globalisation as some 
of the key factors responsible for the over centralisation of power in Nigeria’s federal 
system under the military. These have also been veritable sources of violence and 
conflict in the country. The experience of the civil war (and the emergency powers 
deployed as a result) and the creation of the States ostensibly to assuage agitations on 
perceived marginalisation, led to a fractionalisation that engendered the need for a 
strong homogenizing centre.  
The observation by Dukes that ‘underlying many disputes are struggles over power, 
status, and human needs such as identity, recognition, and security,’28 is very apposite 
to Nigeria’s post-authoritarian period from 1999 to date. The transition from military to 
civil rule provided the space for various hitherto constrained interest groups across the 
country to air grievances and feelings of injustice. This also meant that the undue 
centralisation of power took the centre-stage of socio-political discourse in the country. 
Political commentators have observed that there are ‘intense pressures’ for a review of 
                                                      
27 1960 No.1652 effective 1 October, 1960. 
28 Frank Dukes ‘Public Conflict Resolution: A Transformative Approach’ 9 (1) Negotiation Journal 45, 49 
(1993). 
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the lopsided legislative list to States while the issue of resource distribution has led to 
‘heated debates’ at the dawn of the 21st Century.29  
In its conduct of governance, the military hegemony acted as if the country was 
‘conquered territory’ and its vast resources, ‘spoils of war.’30 Under their reckless 
governance, the country transformed rapidly from one of the richest nations, to one of 
the poorest.31 Although military incursions into power were proclaimed to be in pursuit 
of economic rectitude, unity and peace of the country,32 arguably none of these was 
achieved by the numerous military regimes. Rather, the military left the country in the 
low development human development category33 and institutionalized corruption34 
which has remained a formidable obstacle to good governance in the country. By the 
time it left office, the military establishment had instituted a vicious cycle of violence 
which found expression in domestic violence, armed robbery, brigandage, religious 
riots, impunity and lawlessness in the polity.  
 The Military and the Police in Nigeria’s Post-Independence Experience 
As alluded to earlier, the military came to play a significant role in Nigeria’s post-
independence governance. They had in fact, also played a crucial role in colonial 
governance, beginning with the military domination of Northern Nigeria by Lugard 
prior to 1906. The military and police forces in the country emerged from the armed 
                                                      
29 Elaigwu (2002) 73.  
30 Foreword by the Chairman, Synoptic Overview Oputa Panel Report: Summary, Conclusions and   
Recommendations (2004), 2-3. 
31 Ibid. 
32 G. N. K. Vukor-Quarshie ‘Criminal Justice Administration in Nigeria: Saro-Wiwa in Review’ (1997) 8 
Criminal Law Forum 87, 104. 
33 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Human Development Index 2016 has positions the 
country at 152 out of 188 countries and territories. 
34 Daniel Egiegba Agbiboa ‘Protectors or Predators: The Embedded Problem of Police Corruption and 
Deviance in Nigeria’ (2015) 47 (3) Administration and Society 244, 254-256; M. A. O. Aluko ‘The 
Institutionalization of Corruption and its Impact on Political Culture and Behaviour in Nigeria’ (2002) 11 
Nordic Journal of African Studies 393. 
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forces established by the British to enforce colonial rule in the various territories that 
became Nigeria. Historians like Toyin Falola have pointed out, colonisation in Nigeria 
was a product of violence achieved ‘either by the use of war or surrender because of the 
threat of war’.35 In addition to ‘assisting the British imperialists to smash the resistance 
of local communities to political domination’, they also maintained ‘law and order’ by 
suppressing riots, ‘strikes and revolts’.36 The two bodies were set up to subdue and 
subjugate the local communities in a manner that suited the interests of the colonial 
administration.37 They lacked any connection to the people but owed full loyalty to the 
British rulers. The pioneering force was the Consular Guard established for Lagos 
(South West Nigeria) in 1861. It was made up of officers of Hausa ethnic origin from the 
Northern part of the country, they thus lacked any affinity with the people of Lagos (of 
Yoruba ethnicity) whom they were commissioned to protect.  This approach to 
constituting the armed forces and the Police was a general and consistent policy in the 
colonial period. 
The inherited roots of policing in institutionalised repression and violence constituted 
the Police into an organisation with questionable legitimacy in Nigerian society.38 It was 
common to find that the Police engaged in various abuses of human rights including 
extortion, killing, maiming and looting. This pattern of policing was retained after 
independence and it plays an important negative role in the work of the Police in the 
                                                      
35 Toyin Falola Colonialism and Violence in Nigeria (Indiana University Press Bloomington 2009) 1. 
36 Domkat Y. Bali ‘The Defence of the Nation’ in in Tamuno and Ukpabi (1989) 162-170, 162; on this, the 
Aba/Igbo women’s uprising of 1929 is instructive – 50 women were killed by the colonial administration, 
see Judith Van Allen ‘“Sitting on a Man”: Colonialism and the Lost Political Institutions of Igbo Women’ 
(1972) 6 (2) Canadian Journal of African Studies, 165-181. 
37 See for instance Etannibi E.O. Alemika ‘Colonialism, State and Policing in Nigeria’ (1993) 20 (3) Crime 
Law Social Change 187-219.   
38 Agbiboa (2015) 259-261; Etanibi O. Alemika & Innocent C. Chukwuma Analysis of Police and Policing in 
Nigeria: A Desk Study on the Role of Policing as a Barrier to Change or Driver of Change in Nigeria (CLEEN 
FOUNDATION Lagos Nigeria) 9-11. 
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country to date.39  There is a continuing disconnect between the police and the society 
more than a century and a half after the colonial founding of the Police and military 
forces. As a former Deputy Inspector General of Police, Parry Osayande observed, the 
Police ‘became estranged and alienated from Nigerians’ right from ‘the very first day’ it 
was created.40 It is instructive in this regard that in May 2017, the head of the Nigerian 
Police Force declared that a planned 150,000 more policemen to be recruited over the 
next five years will be deployed to serve in their respective communities to enhance 
‘community policing’ and serve to reverse the historical legacy of the socio-cultural 
disconnect between the police and the communities they are meant to serve across the 
country.41 
Independence and an Unaddressed Past  
The current injustices in Nigeria are strongly connected to Nigeria’s past experience of 
an unaddressed colonial past. The political class who took over the reins of power from 
the colonialists were quick to seize on, and perpetuate violence, human rights violations 
and non-accountability that had featured prominently in the colonial governance of 
Nigeria. Independence was achieved without the armed struggle that was experienced 
in some other parts of Africa.42 Such a struggle could have facilitated better cross-
mobilisation of the various ethnic groups. As Ukpabi observed, this set the stage for a: 
scramble for various forms of power (political, economic, and bureaucratic) which would 
give an ethnic group an edge over others. The situation was made worse by the fact that 
                                                      
39 Open Society Institute and the Network on Police Reform in Nigeria Criminal Force: Torture, Abuse, and 
Extrajudicial Killings by the Nigeria Police Force (Open Society Institute New York 2010). 
40 Parry Osayande ‘Creating Awareness on Concept and Principles of Civilian Oversight of Police’ in I 
Chukwuma (ed) Civilian Oversight and Accountability of Police in Nigeria (Centre for Law Enforcement 
Education Lagos 2003) chp.9, 2.  
41 ‘Nigeria Police to Deploy Officers to Communities of Origin’ Premium Times (Abuja 16 May 2017) 
available at: http://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/231391-nigeria-police-to-deploy-officers-to-
communities-of-origin.html (accessed 16 may 2017). 
42 Like Kenya or Guinea-Bissau for instance.  
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the people saw their security and their future to lie not in the guarantee of the Federal 
government but with their ethnic groups or with the government of their own Region or 
state.43  
Consequently, post-independence, the elite simply stepped in to governance armed 
ostensibly with a legitimacy that the former administration lacked, but proceeded to 
exploit the mobilised ethnic-based fissures in the polity inherited from the latter. The 
‘ruling class’ that took over from the colonial government were ‘content to run the 
[post] colonial state and society without any modifications whatsoever.’44 Thus, rather 
than serve as agents for unifying and advancing the general well-being, the divided elite 
mobilised (and continue to mobilise) the ordinary people against each other in other to 
gain an advantage or maintain existing privileges.45 In the process, the elite deliberately 
or inadvertently perpetuated conflict46 which had been set in motion deliberately but 
also sometimes, unwarily by the colonialists.47  
Military Rule (1966-1999) 
Inception of Military Rule and the Civil War 1967-1970 
As alluded to earlier, authoritarian rule and violations of human rights formed the 
bedrock of British rule in Nigeria48 and this mode of government soon overtook the 
democratic system instituted at independence. Following a period of political crises in 
the country arising from ethnic tensions interlaced with power  struggles carried over 
                                                      
43 Ukpabi (1989) 110 
44 B.O. Adebisi ‘The Challenge of Independence: Major Issues before and After’ in Tekena Tamuno and J.A. 
Atanda Nigeria Since Independence- The First 25 Years: The Civil War Years (Vol. 4 Heinemann Educational 
Books (Nigeria) Ltd 1989)11-29, 18; Badru (2010) 159. 
45 For a detailed exposition on this issue, see Abdul Raufu Mustapha Ethnic Structure, Inequality and 
Governance of the Public Sector in Nigeria (United Nations Research Institute for Social Development 
Geneva 2006). 
46 Ukpabi (1989) 113-114. 
47  Mustapha (2006) 1-4. 
48 Falola (2009)  
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from the pre-independence period, democratic rule was cut short by a military coup 
d’état on 15 January 1966 thus leading to the demise of the country’s first republic.49 
The coup also had a strong element of ethnic cleavage as it was the culmination of an 
armed insurrection organized and led by army officers mainly of Ibo extraction from the 
Eastern Region.50 Eleven national leaders, including the Prime Minister were killed. As 
Arthur Nwanko rightly noted, ‘The ethnic distribution of the casualties of the coup led to 
the allegation that this was an Ibo coup.’51   
Following the coup, the most senior army officer and General Officer Commanding the 
Nigerian Army; Major General Johnson Thomas Aguiyi-Ironsi (an Ibo) became the 
military Head of State. He proclaimed a change from a federal to a unitary political 
system. However, a counter-coup led by officers from the Northern part of the country 
took place two months after.52 Along with General Aguiyi-Ironsi, thirty-two officers 
from Eastern Nigeria, mainly of the Ibo ethnicity were killed. A series of riots then 
erupted in the North in which hundreds (thousands according to some accounts) of Ibos 
were killed. The Eastern Region announced it was seceding from the country by 
declaring the Republic of Biafra on 30 May 1967. This followed failed attempts for 
reconciliation.53 The secession bid led to a thirty-month civil war from 6 July 1967 to 12 
January 1970 with the declaration of surrender by Biafra. Many lives were lost with 
                                                      
49 Badru (2010) 159-161. 
50 Uwechue (1971) 7; It is relevant in this regard to note that at independence and up to the civil war, the 
Ibos constituted the bulk of the officer cadre of the Nigerian army however, things changed dramatically 
after the civil war, as officers from the North came to dominate the Nigerian army for a long time 
afterwards and definitely throughout the period of military rule. See Judd Devermont ‘The US Intelligence 
Community’s Biases during the Nigerian Civil War’ African Affairs (2016) 116 (465): 705–716, 708.  
51 Arthur Nwankwo Nigeria: The Challenge of Biafra (Rex Collings London 1972) 10-11; Uwechue 
similarly notes that: ‘In many non-Ibo hearts, the one-sided pattern of the killings aroused suspicion that 
perhaps the coup was an attempt by Ibos to seize power in the country’. See Uwechue (1971) 29. 
52 Uwechue (1971) 6 
53 Godwin Onuoha ‘Shared Histories, Divided Memories: Mediating and Navigating the Tensions in 
Nigeria–Biafra War Discourses’ Africa Today (2016) 63 (1): 3-21, 5. 
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some accounts claiming the figure ran into the millions.54 Considerable properties and 
major infrastructure of vast areas of the Eastern part of the country were also 
destroyed.55  
The End of the Civil War: ‘Rehabilitation, Reconstruction and Reconciliation’ 
The war was brought to an end largely due to a combination of war fatigue especially on 
Biafra side and the superior military power of the federal side. This circumstance led to 
the unilateral declaration of surrender by the Eastern Region government on 12 January 
1970 and acceptance of it by the Federal Military Government on 15 January 1970 at a 
formal ceremony in Lagos. Consequently, the war is deemed to have officially ended on 
15 January 1970 which is celebrated as Armed Forces Day in the country.  In 
furtherance of its declared policy to unite the country, and achieve speedy reintegration 
of the people of the estranged Eastern Region, the Federal Government of Nigeria 
declared a ‘general amnesty for those who misled into rebellion’, ‘healing the nation’s 
wound’ as well as ‘reconciliation in full equality’.56 The military Head of State, General 
Yakubu Gowon announced that there was ‘no victor, no vanquished.’ He stated 
government’s plans for rehabilitating not just civil and public servants, but also the self-
employed.57 He further stated that ‘special attention will be given to the rehabilitation of 
women and children in particular.’58 
                                                      
54 O.B.C. Nwolise ‘The Social Consequences of the Civil War in Biafra’ in Tekena Tamuno (ed.) proceedings 
of the National Conference on Nigeria Since Independence (Panel on Nigeria Since Independence 1984) 21-
44, 39. 
55 Ibid.    
56 Major-General Yakubu Gowon ‘The Dawn of Reconciliation’ (Federal Ministry of Information Press 
Release No.47 ‘Broadcast to the Nation by the Head of the Federal Military Government and Commander-
in-Chief of the Armed Forces, Major-General Yakubu Gowon, Thursday, January 15, 1970) in Tamuno and 
Ukpabi (1989) 76-79, 77. 
57 Ibid. at 77-78. 
58 Ibid. at 78. 
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A programme for ‘rehabilitation, reconstruction and reconciliation’ (3Rs)59 was 
embedded in the country’s Second National Development Plan (2nd NDP)60 (1971-1974) 
for post-war reconstruction and development. The plan had contained forty percent 
(40%) of the total public-sector capital investment61 as part of a wider agenda for ‘social 
change’.62 However, implementation of the plan was weak and the 3Rs had very limited 
implementation. The national development plans dated back to the colonial period and 
embedding the reconstruction and rehabilitation projects in them was problematic. It is 
not clear why the government took the NDP as its point of departure but the approach 
suggests inadequate appreciation of the requirement for a specific focus on the needs of 
the war-damaged areas which were largely in the South-eastern part of the country. In 
practice, the approach meant infrastructural losses and damage resulting from the war 
had to compete with a larger project of national infrastructural and socioeconomic 
development. This had a detrimental effect on the substantive reconstruction of the 
affected areas. For instance, a report in 2017 showed that the only bridge that provided 
external access to a community in the theatre of war which was damaged by federal 
troops has only just been earmarked for reconstruction only 47 years later. 63 
Many victims were not compensated or rehabilitated at the time or at all. Nonetheless, a 
post-conflict measure that was implemented with considerable success was the 
welcome extended to the Ibos returning to other parts of Nigeria from where they had 
                                                      
59 Olukunle Ojeleye The Politics of Post-War Demobilisation and Reintegration in Nigeria (Ashgate 
Farnham 2010) xiii. 
60 Ibid. at 2. 
61 R. O. Ekundare ‘Nigeria’s Second National Development Plan as a Weapon of Social Change’ (1971) 70 
(279) African Affairs 146, 152 
62 Ibid.  at 147. 
63 Emmanuel Ikora ‘47 years after Civil War: Govt Begins Construction of Link Roads to Isolated A’Ibom 
Communities’  Vanguard Newspaper (Abuja 16 April 2017) available at: 
http://www.vanguardngr.com/2017/05/47-years-civil-wargovt-begins-construction-link-roads-
isolated-aibom-communities/  
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fled during the crisis leading to the civil-war. This has been described as a ‘tremendous 
success’: 
Igbos [Ibos] were encouraged to return to their migratory entrepreneurialism, which 
carried them to all corners of Nigeria…to a large extent they were indeed welcomed, and 
certainly Igbos re-established their businesses and pan-Nigeria presence remarkably 
quickly.64 
In Lagos for instance, the Ibos were able to return to their properties and  some testified 
that they came back to Lagos to find that, not only was their property preserved for 
them but that their friends had continued to collect rents and had kept those rents [for 
them].65   
Still, there were concerns in some cases stemming from government appropriation of 
the landed properties of the Ibos who had fled to Biafra. Such landed properties 
(residential and commercial buildings) had been declared ‘abandoned’ and were not 
handed back to the owners even when they returned to claim them. The situation was 
particularly acute in the city of Port Harcourt which became the capital of the Rivers 
State, in Nigeria’s ‘South-South’ region.66 This issue is a one of the major contributors to 
a strong sense of marginalisation in ‘popular political discourse’ among the Ibos in post-
civil war Nigeria.67 Tamuno has noted that the challenges that arose with regard to the 
restoration of properties to their former Ibo owners in Port Harcourt was due to both 
                                                      
64 Daniel Jordan Brown ‘Corruption Complaints, Inequality and Ethnic Grievances in Post-Biafra Nigeria’ 
(2014) 35 (5) Third World Quarterly 787-802, 791 
65 Interview with Ayo Obe a senior legal practitioner; former chair of the Transition Monitoring Group (an 
election-monitoring and democracy-building coalition of independent Nigerian NGOs); Trustee,  
International Crisis Group; former President of the Civil Liberties Organisation,  Lagos, Nigeria, 05 May 
2017. 
66 See in this respect the Rivers State Abandoned Property Edict, 1969. 
67 Brown 2014, 788. 
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pre-war resentment and post-war political changes and administrative complications in 
the area68 
Timely resolution of the abandoned property dispute by the interested parties 
was however marred by the problem of accurate documentation of such 
property and by the earlier misleading references to Port Harcourt as an ‘'Ibo 
town.’69    
Apparently, the circumstance of the war in which indigenous communities - those 
deemed to be native to the place as against those considered as settlers70 - in Port 
Harcourt and the wider Niger Delta region supported the federal side provided 
opportunity for affirmation of their ownership of Port Harcourt which had being 
declared the capital city of the new Rivers State created by the federal government just 
before the out-break of the war.  
 Legal Framework and Political Economy under Military Rule 1970-1999 
Successive military regimes followed the path of colonial legislation to impose their rule 
in a manner similar to colonial rule. Following colonial tradition, the first piece of 
legislation handed down by the military government that came into power in 1966 not 
only proscribed the Parliament,71 it also contained the provision that the Federal 
Military Government ‘shall have power to make laws for the peace, order and good 
                                                      
68 Tekena N. Tamuno ‘Patriotism and Statism in the Rivers State, Nigeria’ (1972) 71 (284) African Affairs 
264-281, 274-279. 
69 Tamuno 1972, 281.  
7070 The indigene-settler binary is a major source of conflict in the country and is intertwined with 
citizenship. While the latter is defined in the constitution, the latter is not but various states and the 
political elite use employ the binary for various purposes that generates tension since they relate to 
inclusion and exclusion for certain purposes, including sometimes, social services, cultural and economic 
rights. See for instance Jibrin Ibrahim (ed) Citizenship and Indigeneity Conflicts in Nigeria (IPCR, OSIWA 
and CDD 2012) available at: http://cddwestafrica.org/conflict/ (accessed 18 December 2017). 
71 Decree No.1 of 1966. The military named federal and state legislation Decree and Edict respectively.  
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government of Nigeria or any part on any matter whatsoever.’72  The purpose of all such 
laws was to make military legislation superior to constitutional rules. Such laws either 
prohibited courts from questioning the legality of military actions or limited their ability 
to do so. The colonial government had made ‘received English law’ a source of law in the 
Nigerian legal system.73 In England (and more broadly, the United Kingdom) law 
reforms have been undertaken to keep the criminal justice system in step with 
contemporary reality. Thus, some of the laws referred to as ‘statutes of general 
application’ have been amended or repealed in view of the various developments in the 
nature of crimes, technological advancements and current experience. However, this 
has not been the case in Nigeria. The continuing application of such rules in Nigeria, 
without substantive amendments, despite changing contemporary realities has a 
negative impact on the effective and speedy disposal of criminal cases.  
Two among a number of important disturbing features of the legal and statutory 
framework of governance in Nigeria’s political transition linked to the colonial past are 
highlighted by Gani Fawehinmi, Justice Chukwudifu Oputa (Rtd.) and Human Rights 
Violations Investigation Commission v General Ibrahim Babangida, Brigadier Halilu Akilu 
and Brigadier Kunle Togun (the Oputa Panel Case).74 First is the continued extensive 
reliance on autocratic legislation by all branches of government deriving from the 
colonial past and authoritarian military rule. Deriving from this state of affairs, an 
elected transition government placed reliance on the Tribunals of Inquiry Act (TIA), a 
pre-republican legislation, to set up a truth commission by executive action rather than 
                                                      
72 Section 3 of the Decree. Similar provisions are contained in Section 2 (1) of the Constitution 
(Suspension and Modification) Decree No.1 of 1983. 
73 Obilade (1990) 64-89. 
74 [2003] M.J.S.C 63 to which we return later. For an extensive consideration of the case, see Hakeem O. 
Yusuf ‘The Judiciary and Constitutionalism in Transition – A Critique’ (2007a) 7 (3) Global Jurist 1. 
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custom-made legislation. This was at a time when the latter approach had become 
standard practice elsewhere as was in Ghana and South Africa for instance. The 
approach arguably makes for democratic participation in the articulation of the terms of 
reference, powers, and procedures of the truth-telling mechanism.. It is relevant to 
observe that the legal framework for truth-telling remained unchanged in the country 
though there is now consciousness on the undesirability of the situation, positive action 
to rectify it remains marginal. Thus the anomaly has continued with truth processes 
that have been initiated in the country.75 Second is the conventional, uncritical judicial 
observance of precedents based on principles of the common law imported into the 
country as part of the colonial legal system. This is reflected in the extensive reliance by 
the Supreme Court on the case of Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa & Others v Doherty 
&Others (Balewa v Doherty)76 in the Oputa Panel Case.  In Balewa v Doherty the Federal 
Supreme Court as well as the Privy Council upheld objections to the powers and the 
jurisdictional scope of the Commissions of Enquiry Act, 1961, which had similar 
provisions to the TIA. The Supreme Court rather adopted a plain-fact approach to which 
it was no doubt accustomed and thereby hit at the root of the transitional context and 
implicitly at the least, undermined the rule of law. However, as it has been correctly 
pointed out, the issue in the case had to do with banking matters and ought to have been 
distinguished in the Oputa case not the least because of the circumstances of transition 
and the international human rights obligations of the country.77  
                                                      
75 Principally at the state level like those in Rivers and Osun Sates. 
76 (1963) 1 WLR 949 
77 Yusuf (2007a) 84; for an evaluation of the earlier decision of the Court of Appeal to the same effect see, 
P. Ehi Oshio ‘The Constitutionality and Powers of the Human Rights Violations Investigation Commission 
(Oputa Panel)’ (2001/2002) 7 (1) University of Benin Law Journal 116-135. 
Page 23 of 85 
 
 
Moreover, as recent as 2015, then Chief Justice of the Nigeria, Justice Mahmud 
Mohammed lamented, laws regulating the criminal justice system were obsolete. 
Canvassing the need for reform, he stated that: 
We face prolonged delays in the trial of criminal cases leading to an increase in detainees 
awaiting trial and the congestion of the prisons… The situation is made more precarious 
due to the archaic and obsolete nature of the laws regulating the criminal justice system.78 
A vital step in addressing the challenges was the eventual passage of the Administration 
of Criminal Justice Act (ACJA) 2015.79 The same issues still bedevil the evidence laws of 
the country leading to problems in the admission of electronic evidence in civil and 
criminal cases. In similar vein, the Police Act remained as enacted in 1943 with outdated 
punishment for some offences and gender-based discriminatory age requirements for 
employment.  
The country’s 37.9 billion barrels of proven reserves places it at the vantage position of 
being the largest producer of oil in Africa and tenth largest in the world.80 The over-
dependence on oil paved the way for environmental degradation, communal tensions in 
the host communities (caused by disruptions to economic activities centred on farming 
and fishing), conflict and violations of human rights in the Niger Delta. The record of 
violations of human rights is more extensive than the foregoing highlights and is 
discussed in further detail through an examination of the work of the truth-seeking 
mechanism established soon after political transition to civil rule.  
                                                      
78 Ikechukwu Inochiri ‘Laws Regulating Criminal Trials in Nigeria Archaic – CJN’ Vanguard Newspaper (23 
March 2015) available at: http://www.vanguardngr.com/2015/03/laws-regulating-criminal-trials-in-
nigeria-archaic-cjn/ (accessed 14 March 2017). 
79 The ACJA is aimed at promoting the ‘efficient management of criminal justice institutions, speedy 
dispensation of justice, protection of the society from crimes and protection of the rights and interests of 
the suspect, the defendant and victims’. However, due both to its recent passage and the slow pace of 
adaptation to its provisions by the judiciary and criminal justice agencies, it is yet to make significant 
impact in criminal justice administration in the country. 
80 ‘Worldwide Look at Reserves and Production’ Oil & Gas Journal (January 1, 2015). 
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The control of natural resources and the issue dates back to the colonial period. The 
Minerals Act of 1946 vested control of all minerals in the country on the colonial 
government.81 The Federal Government stepped into the colonial shoes at 
independence but the ‘derivation principle’82 mitigated federal control because it 
provided that 50% of all revenues from the minerals be remitted to the regions of 
origin. In addition, the three regions also shared 30% of the derived revenue equally.83 
However, the post-independence promulgation of several decrees by successive 
military regimes further effectively expropriated the control of natural resources for the 
federal government.84 The absence of consultation with relevant stakeholders led to 
various groups, usually ethnic-based, taking up arms against the centre and military 
rule.85   
The military regimes perfected plunder, compromised all institutions of state and 
generally directed them towards flagrant violations of human rights of the people.86  
The population suffered repression, state-sponsored murder, restrictions on civil 
liberties and other forms of human rights violations which were disclosed at the public 
and private hearings of the Oputa Panel.87 There was widespread use of lethal force by 
                                                      
81 The 1946 Minerals Act was re-enacted as the Minerals and Mining Decree (1999) and now styled Act 
No 34. It provides that the ‘entire property in and control of all minerals, in, under or upon any land in 
Nigeria, its contiguous continental shelf and of all rivers, streams and watercourses throughout Nigeria, 
any area covered by territorial waters or constituency, the Exclusively Economic Zone is and shall be 
vested in the Government of the Federation for and on behalf of the people of Nigeria.’  
82 Introduced in 1946 as part of the federal arrangement during the colonial period. 
83 International Crisis Group Nigeria’s Faltering Federal Experiment Crisis Group Africa Report N°119, 
(October 2006) 1, 4.  
84 These are notably the 1971 Offshore Oil Revenues Decree; 1971 Territorial Waters (Amendment) 
Decree; 1970 Petroleum Profits Tax (Amendment) Decree; 1969 Oil Terminal Dues Decree, the 1978 Land 
Use Decree; the 1969 and 1991 Petroleum Decrees; the 1993 Lands (Title Vesting etc.) Decree (Osborne 
Land Decree), the 1997 National Inland Waterways Authority Decree (as variously amended); among 
others. 
85 Sola Akinrinade ‘Constitutionalism and the Resolution of Conflicts in Nigeria’ 92 (368) The Round Table 
40 (-52), 42-44 (2003). 
86 Synoptic Overview (2004). 
87 Discussed below 
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security agents and the police against the civilian populace. For instance between 1966 
and 1993, over two hundred military officers and civilians were brought before military 
tribunals on charges related to at least seven instances of actual or alleged coup plots 
were convicted and sentenced to death while some were jailed.88 This was particularly 
rife during the Babangida and Abacha military regimes of 1985-1993 and 1993-1998 
respectively with the latter regime in particular gaining notoriety for alleging phantom 
coups against serving and retired military officers as well as some civilian members of 
society it perceived as opposition elements.89  
Special Military Tribunals (SMTs) were established to try a number of civil offences, 
including armed robbery, drug trafficking, corruption in public office, and ‘economic 
sabotage.’ SMTs were almost invariably chaired by serving senior military officers, and 
composed mainly of members of the military and security agencies as well as a few 
civilians. They commonly imposed the death penalty and the convicted were in some 
instances summarily executed, in breach of their constitutional right of appeal. Cases of 
public execution in defiance of due process included that of Ogoni Rights activist and 
renowned author, Kenule Saro-Wiwa and some other members of the Movement for the 
Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) referred to as the ‘Ogoni nine’90 in November 
1995.91 Others were sentenced to very long terms of imprisonment. Political transition 
                                                      
88 For a discussion of the various coups and the military tribunal set up to try the suspects, see Emmanuel 
O. Ojo ‘Guarding the “Guardians” A Prognosis of Panacea for Evolving Stable Civil–Military Relations in 
Nigeria’  (2009) 35 (4) Armed Forces & Society  688-708. 
89 See for instance Bayo Akinloye ‘Some Generals Wanted to Blow up Plane Carrying Obasanjo, Others — 
Col. Oloruntoba’ Punch (Lagos 16 April 2017); Peter M. Lewis ‘End Game in Nigeria?: The Politics of a 
Failed Democratic Transition’ (1994) 93 (372) African Affairs 323, 330; Bayo Akinloye ‘Bamaiyi is An Evil 
Liar, He Tortured MKO before His Death — Col. Ajayi’ Punch (Lagos 9 April 2017); Bayo Akinloye 
‘Obasanjo is Not Example of a Good Leader – Cmdr Omessa’ Punch (Lagos 23 April 2017).  
90 For a more detailed account of the judicial murder of the Ken Saro-Wiwa and some members of the 
Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) see A Maja-Pearce From Khaki to Agbada: A 
Handbook for the February 1999 Elections in Nigeria (Civil Liberties Organisation Lagos 1999) 12-17. 
91 This was for alleged involvement in the killing of four senior Ogoni chiefs. 
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in Nigeria was largely brought about by the sudden death of the country’s military 
leader, General Sanni Abacha in June 1998. He was succeeded by General Abdusalami 
Abubakar. 
POLITICAL TRANSITION AND TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE  
General Abubakar was unequivocal in his resolve to deliver a prompt transition to 
democratic governance in the country which he accomplished in less than a year in 
office, with his military government handing over power to an elected administration 
on 29 May 1999. General Abubakar was acutely aware of the high-level of domestic and 
international opposition to continued military rule in the country and the 
democratisation wave that was taking hold in former authoritarian societies across 
African, Eastern Europe and Latin America in the late 1980s and the 1990s.92 The 
handover marked the end years of authoritarian military rule and several aborted cycles 
of expensive political transition programmes to democratic rule.93 Chief Olusegun 
Obasanjo, a retired general and former head of state emerged as President. The election 
of Chief Obasanjo was accepted internationally, though largely criticized at home as it 
was felt that he was a candidate of the old-guard in the military. Notwithstanding the 
circumstance of the political transition programme, there was the recognition across 
the polity for a need to implement transitional justice measures to deal with issues of 
gross violations of human rights. Thus, at the dawn of its transition to civil rule, the 
Federal Government of Nigeria attempted to engage with the past.  
                                                      
92 Lewis 1994, 43. 
93 The most prominent of these was the political transition programme aborted by self-styled ‘military 
President’ General Ibrahim Babangida in 1992 following the historic election victory of Chief Moshood 
Abiola at the presidential elections. See Lewis, 1994, 43. 
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The discussion in this section examines the rather limited transitional justice measures 
initiated by General Abubakar; namely legal reforms, trials and lustration processes 
before analysing the truth-seeking process which was the main mechanism that was 
instituted for dealing with the past. The analyses then turn to the formation, mandate 
and legislation of the Oputa Panel and its work. Special attention is paid to the petition 
on the murder of Dele Giwa, a frontline investigative journalist. This petition resonated 
during the life of the Oputa Panel and the litigation that arose from it played a central 
role in the non-release and non-implementation of its recommendations. Finally, the 
analyses shift to the problems that challenged the work of the Oputa Panel as well as the 
aftermath of the process. However, before proceeding with the analyses as set out, a 
relevant starting point is to examine the role of civil society in the political transition 
process. 
Civil Society and Politics of a Non-Negotiated Democratic Transition  
The context of an elite-driven democratic transition accounts at least in part for the 
subsequent absence of a transitional justice agenda or at best, an uncoordinated 
approach to securing justice for the victims of gross violations of human rights during 
the period of military rule in the country. One important consequence has been how it 
limited the opportunities for civil society to set an agenda for the transition including an 
engagement with the impact of colonial rule.  
It is important to note that the military either intimidated or compromised and 
factionalised civil society groups (CSGs) during the authoritarian period. The military 
governments, especially under the Babangida and Abacha military regimes in the late 
1980s to the mid-1990s were particularly notorious in this regard. The military regimes 
adopted a carrot and stick approach in its dealings with CSGs to divide them and 
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weaken their capacity to mobilise public opinion and action against them especially in 
the context of various failed promised political transition programmes and bad 
governance. Among others, the military particularly targeted  higher and tertiary 
education students’ associations (like the National Association of Nigerian Students); 
professional associations of journalists (like the Guild of Editors and the National Union 
of Journalists, National Association of Women Journalists); the Nigeria Bar Association 
(NBA); Nigerian Medical Association; university staff unions (Academic Staff Union of 
Universities; Non-Academic Staff Union); labour unions (like the Nigeria Labour 
Congress); market women associations, and even socio-cultural associations. One 
approach was to infiltrate the leadership of such groups to compromise them, and 
where this was not possible, to harass and intimidate them through unlawful arrests, 
detention, dismissals and in some cases, extra-judicial murder. The former tactic was 
evident in various attempts by the military to co-opt the leadership of the NBA including 
appointing successive presidents as Minister of Justice and Attorney-General. The latter 
approach was adopted by the military regimes in the Ken Saro and MOSOP case 
mentioned above as well the arrests, detention and sometimes, disappearance and 
murder of fearless journalists like Bagauda Kaltho and Chinedu Offoaro with the most 
notorious being the letter-bomb murder of Dele Giwa.94    
Further, transitional justice in Nigeria was also negatively impacted by the scepticism 
that had developed around the political transition programme. This facilitated the 
entrenchment of the military old guard in power. It is essential to understand in this 
regard that by the time General Abubakar initiated his political transition to civil rule 
programme,  civil society groups no longer trusted the military to hand over power to a 
                                                      
94 Discussed below. 
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democratic government. As Richard Akinnola, a founding member of the Civil Liberties 
Organisation (CLO),95 pointed out, ‘[General] Abdusalami [Abubakar] came up with his 
transition programme but because of previous experience under [General ] Abacha, it 
was difficult to trust them (the military).’ 96 Consequently, the Joint Action Committee 
for Nigerians (JACON) which was an umbrella for civil society groups decided to boycott 
the transition programme to avoid being ‘fooled again’.97 Elections into the national 
legislature and the Presidential elections had over 40 percent and 52 percent of 
registered voters’ turn-out respectively.98 
With the benefit of hindsight, the non-engagement of civil society groups with the 
political transition programme was ‘a fundamental mistake’.99 It meant that civil society 
groups left the political space to those who were not interested in justice for victims of 
gross violation of human rights. As one civil society leader observed  
All we wanted was to create an enabling environment for democracy, constitutionalism, 
rule of law and democracy to germinate. It has been found to have been very incorrect 
and wrong for us to have done that without actually thinking about power. Perhaps if 
civil society had thought about having a broad political power and implement all those 
things that they fought for, it would have been better...Power was on the streets and it 
was grabbed by those who were wielding power at that time in concert with the political 
arm most of whom were opportunists.100  
 
Reflecting on the impact of public weariness to the endless transition programmes 
initiated by successive military regimes, Abiola Akiyode-Afolabi, chair of the Transition 
Monitoring Group (TMG)101  similarly pointed out that at the time 
                                                      
95 The foremost human rights organisation in the country. 
96 Interview with Richard Akinnola (human rights activist, journalist and author), Lagos, Nigeria, 5 April, 
2017. 
97 Interview with Richard Akinnola 2017. 
98 ‘Election Guide: Democracy Assistance and Election News- Federal Republic of Nigeria’ 
http://www.electionguide.org/countries/id/158/ accessed (02 December 2017). 
99 Interview with Richard Akinnola 2017. 
100 Interview with Nurudeen Ogbara 2017. 
101 Nigeria’s foremost election observation group, coalition of 400 civil society organisations involved in 
monitoring the political transition process and in particular, election monitoring.  
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Human rights activists did not care what party came into power…people just 
wanted the military out. The political transition that took place in 1999 was like 
from military to military, but in civilian clothes.102  
The ensuing gap provided opportunity for the conservative political elite that emerged 
to entrench themselves in power. They consciously made it virtually impossible for 
those with an alternative political agenda which could challenge the status quo of 
unaccountability, to secure a foothold in the democratic space. 
Initial Transitional Justice Measures – Legal ‘Reforms’, Trials and Lustration 
The first steps toward transitional justice were actually taken by the last military 
regime led by General Abubakar perhaps to advance the acceptability of his government 
particularly when the country had reached the lowest point of its pariah status 
internationally. As an important part of the transition process, the military government 
of General Abubakar implemented limited legal ‘reforms’. General Abubakar repealed a 
number of military decrees (around fourteen of them) a few of which were political 
transition-related legislation. Most of the affected decrees were draconian legislation 
that limited the operation of the Constitution and or, curtailed various civil and political 
rights. They included decrees suspending or subordinating parts of the Constitution, 
prescribing military supremacy legislation (referred to earlier), establishing special 
military tribunals, ‘civil disturbances’ offences, state security and detention of persons 
and establishing military courts and tribunals for civil offences. Others were decrees 
proscribing some media organisations and prescribing treasonable offences. 103   
                                                      
102 Interview with Dr Abiola Akiyode-Afolabi (transitional justice expert and human rights activist) 6 
April 2017, Lagos, Nigeria. 
 
103 See Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria ( Certain Consequential Repeals ) Decree No. 63 
of  1999, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria  
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The Abubakar administration also promulgated a ‘new’ Constitution for the country.104  
This introduced some changes like the establishment of the National Judicial Council 
which was composed largely of the leadership of the judiciary at the federal and state 
levels (all of whom had been appointed during the military era) along with few senior 
lawyers, for the appointment and discipline of judges and the Council of State to advise 
the President whenever requested to do so on the maintenance of public order in the 
country.105 However, the democratic legitimacy of that Constitution remains a major 
issue. It was essentially a product of a closed process undertaken by a few selected 
individuals appointed by General Abubakar. The panel worked without any serious 
attempt at public consultation. Indeed, the product was essentially a revamping of the 
1979 Constitution with some amendments. The Constitution was approved by the 
Provisional Ruling Council headed by General Abubakar.106 It was promulgated into law 
by a military decree in the circumstance that it was not made by a democratic process. It 
thus left unaddressed, many issues that agitated the minds of various groups and 
interests in the country. The non-participatory process instituted for constitution-
making further fuelled distrust of the civil society groups in the political transition 
process.107  
The legitimacy question remains a major issue with Nigerian constitutions past and 
present. As stated in the Report of the 2014 National Conference, from the colonial 
period till date, the country has only been saddled with ‘false constitutions’ by the 
colonial administrators (before independence) and the military  (post-independence): 
                                                      
104 Decree 24 of 1999 containing the current 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. 
105 Section 15, 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. 
106 Human Rights Watch ‘Nigeria- Human Rights Developments’ (1990) available at 
 https://www.hrw.org/legacy/wr2k/Africa-07.htm (accessed 03 May 2017). 
107 Interview with Richard Akinnola 2017. 
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a truly acceptable constitution has not emerged to mediate the social contract between 
the constituent nationalities of the country and the Nigerian state… successive 
constitutions have…been vitiated by the absence of that critical organic connection which 
they are supposed to have had with the spirit of the people in order to give meaning to 
their cry of ‘We the People…’108  
The Abubakar regime also commenced the prosecution of a handful of notorious 
military and security operatives of the penultimate military regime. About fifteen 
notorious members of the Abacha regime, alleged to have played prominent roles in 
state sponsored killings and violence, were arraigned for various serious offences 
ranging from murder and kidnapping, embezzlement of public funds, to arson. Some of 
those arrested and charged included Abacha’s son, Mohammed, his National Security 
Adviser, a former chief of army staff, chief security officer of the former head of state, his 
chief police detail, his former chief security adviser, and a former military administrator 
of one of the States in the country. These individuals formed part of a group deemed to 
be particularly powerful and capable of threatening the new administration. While 
some of the trials became moribund due to the absence of political will to proceed, 
many others have (except three)109 not been concluded.  
The delay in the trial process of cases forming part of the transitional justice measures 
is due largely to the exploitation of a very weak criminal justice system which remains 
largely unreformed since the colonial era discussed earlier. Defence counsels - 
                                                      
108 National Conference 2014: Final Draft of Conference Report  (14 August 2014) 51 available at: 
http://www.premiumtimesng.com/national-conference/download-nigeria-2014-national-conference-
report-ngconfab-2/ 
109 The Former Chief of Army Staff was charged with attempted murder of the publisher of a leading 
newspaper and was discharged and acquitted after eight years of trail on 2nd April 2008. The son of 
General Abacha was charged with conspiracy to commit murder of a wife of the winner of the 1993 
Presidential elections in one of the country’s aborted political transition programmes. He was ordered 
released by the Supreme Court on a ‘no-case’ submission in what was viewed as a politically influenced 
decision by the Obasanjo regime. The Chief Security Officer was convicted of murder but was acquitted on 
appeal. A final appeal to the Supreme Court is pending. 
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especially experienced senior lawyers - often exploit the state of the law to frustrate the 
speedy disposal of criminal proceedings in the name of fair hearing. A practice of raising 
all sorts of objections to the trial, and where that fails, alleging bias against the trial-
judge has developed in the country. This practice was exploited in virtually 
unprecedented fashion in the line of cases involving former members of General 
Abacha’s regime mentioned earlier. The practice also involved appealing virtually every 
interlocutory issue or objection all the way to the Supreme Court and insisting on a ‘stay 
of proceedings’ (suspending the trial) while awaiting the appeal decision. Once the issue 
on appeal is decided, new applications are made (sometimes by another defendant on 
the same issue) and a vicious circle of long-standing trials is maintained.  
The situation was compounded by the approach of the judges whose view of the 
demands of the common law tradition of adjudication was that of a rather distant 
umpire whose role was to hear and determine all applications (even where such is an 
evident abuse of the judicial process). In practice, most trial judges hardly maintained a 
control of their courts and this facilitated abuse of process and inordinate delay by 
defence counsels in the name of legitimate defence of clients. In one instance, after 
frustrating continuation of his trial for more than seven years through such a process, 
the accused brought an application to challenge the delay he had orchestrated as an 
injustice.110 Meanwhile, the accused persons in their bid to secure reprieve at all costs, 
were alleging persecution and appealing to ethnic and religious sentiments in the 
media.   
The transitional justice-related trials, more than any other criminal trials in the 
country’s history, brought to the fore the need to reform the criminal justice system as 
                                                      
110 The author was part of the prosecution team in these cases from 2000-2006. 
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pointed out earlier. The foregoing state of affairs in the judiciary calls further attention 
to the institutional heritage of the judiciary from its colonial founding. To the average 
citizen, the judiciary, to a large extent, constitutes one of the most prominent symbols of 
a colonial heritage. It is usually considered as being at some remove from the regular 
day-to-day activities of ordinary people. Even in the post-authoritarian period in 
Nigeria, the courts continue to suffer from a serious ‘social legitimacy’ deficit, enjoying 
recognition within a much circumscribed segment of society.111 The public trust in the 
judiciary as an institution for securing rights and abating impunity is understandably 
low in the circumstances.  
Whatever might have been the weaknesses of the criminal justice system, it is important 
to bear in mind that the initial move by the Abubakar regime to even prosecute the few 
individuals for violations of human rights was half-hearted at best. The move was 
conditioned by the reality of the precarious balance of power in the short life of that 
‘transitional regime’ itself. From a pragmatic point of view, the fact was also not lost on 
him that the minions of his predecessor remained in the corridors of power and they 
could attempt to topple his regime through a coup if the opportunity presented itself. 
Another feature of the Abubakar regime was the symbolic lustration of about two 
hundred politically exposed military officers from active service. These officers had held 
political appointments as governors or administrators of the various States, cabinet 
ministers and chairmen of key state agencies, public corporations and similar 
government institutions. Many of them had been corrupt and accumulated fabulous 
wealth well beyond their legitimate earnings. The experience had made holding political 
                                                      
111 H Kwasi Prempeh ‘Marbury in Africa: Judicial Review and the Challenge of Constitutionalism in 
Contemporary Africa’ (2006) 80 Tulane Law Review 1239, 1301.  
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office, rather than military service for which they were engaged, very attractive and one 
of the major incentives for coup-plotting.  
The lustration of those considered as politically exposed military officers was also 
carried out by Chief Obasanjo soon after he came to power in 1999. He purged 93 top 
military officers from the armed forces.112 Those affected were generally in the same 
category as those earlier disengaged by General Abubakar. It was felt that such military 
officers were a threat to the country’s ‘budding democracy’.113 According to Chief 
Obasanjo, the disengagement of such military officers was a critical step for securing 
professionalism of the country’s military and correcting the aberration of their holding 
political office in the first place.114 Thus, the lustration process was directed at 
protecting the new civil regime rather than at ensuring institutional reform and riding 
the military of violators of human rights. 
The circumstances of the judiciary, trials and limited application of lustration 
highlighted above, raise wider issues of institutional legacies from the colonial 
experience. There are issues that could be considered in this regard across the spectrum 
of government institutions like the civil service, the security agencies; the military and 
intelligence services, the police and so on at the point of independence. There was 
generally no recourse to what would today be regarded as transitional justice measures 
or processes. There were no trials for human rights violations just as there was no 
record of the use of lustration at the time.  
                                                      
112  Olugbenga Adanikin and Ibrahim Azeez ‘Why I Sacked 93 Top Military Officers in 1999 – Obasanjo’ 
The Nation (Lagos 16 July 2017) http://thenationonlineng.net/obasanjo-purged-army-1999/ (accessed 
16 July 2017). 
113 Idris Ibrahim ‘I Have No Regret Retiring Politically Exposed Military Officers – Obasanjo’ Premium 
Times (05 July 2017 Abuja) http://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/top-news/235897-i-no-regret-
retiring-politically-exposed-military-officers-obasanjo.html (accessed 05 July 2017). 
114 Ibrahim 2017.  
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There are a number of possible explanations for the absence of transitional justice 
measures at independence. First, despite the Nuremberg precedent, transitional justice 
had not yet assumed the prominence it now has. Second, there is the reality that the 
international system has constituted the major catalyst in the adoption and 
implementation of transitional justice processes across the world. The international 
system was very much under the control and direction of countries that were also 
colonial powers at the time. There was understandably no appetite among the relevant 
players to subject their governments and institutions to accountability for the colonial 
enterprise. Another explanation could be that the absence of an armed struggle for 
independence in Nigeria made the imperative of transitional justice measures less 
pressing, even if arguably relevant. There was no experience of gross and widespread 
violations of human rights of individuals and groups involved in the independence 
movement. The campaign for independence was conducted essentially peacefully 
through the local press, political parties and trade unions. There was no mass liberation 
movement or struggle that involved widespread violence in Nigeria, unlike the 
experience in a country like Kenya with its Kenya Land and Freedom Army (KLFA).115  
Moreover, as stated earlier, Nigeria remained a part of the British realm with Queen 
Elizabeth II as Head of State for another three years after independence. In the 
circumstance, most institutions of government, including the police and the armed 
forces, the judiciary and the civil service were either still headed by British officials or 
had British officials in very senior positions until at least 1963 when Nigeria became a 
republic. In addition, the British had also made clear that they intended to continue to 
do business with Nigeria, ostensibly to the mutual benefit of both countries. Indeed, as 
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one commentator has observed, the British (and the French) had ensured independence 
for its territories like Nigeria was organised to put in place ‘constitutional transfers of 
power to ideologically friendly, moderate political parties which would broadly align 
themselves with the interests of the former colonial power.’116 This approach meant 
that those who took over from the departing colonial power were allowed into such 
succession only after it was fairly certain they would not be interested in instituting 
justice for past abuses.  
In any event, even left to their devices, the elite, as stated above were, and remain keen 
to take over the privileges enjoyed by the departing British colonialists. That objective 
severely relegated the significance of conducting an inquiry into securing justice for the 
victims of gross violations of human rights resulting from colonial rule or reforming 
state institutions for post-colonial governance. Put another way, the interests of the 
political elite made the prospect of transitional justice plainly unattractive, and even if it 
was attractive, the mechanisms by which it would be implemented were severely 
compromised by the structures established under colonisation. 
The post-colonial precedent established a culture of condoning impunity of those who 
have held power. Arguably, that legacy, at least to a reasonable extent, created an 
atmosphere in which there is little appetite for a sustained engagement with 
transitional justice even after the period of military rule. Rather, as Nurudeen Ogbara 
noted  
When the politicians also took over, they also became politicians in uniform and 
therefore continued with the military tendencies of doing things against the rule of law 
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and due process…The civilians elected also began to do things like the military. They 
became antagonistic to the rule of law, constitutionalism and democracy.117  
Nevertheless, as stated earlier, the truth-telling process is the most important 
transitional justice mechanism adopted in the post-authoritarian/military era in 
Nigeria, and it will be considered below.   
The Truth-Seeking Process: Oputa Panel, 29 June 1999-28 May 2002  
Formation and Mandate 
During his political campaign for the presidency, Chief Obasanjo had spoken about the 
need to address gross violations of human rights, secure justice for victims and as well 
as the need to ‘heal the nation’. His inaugural address to the country also made direct 
reference to these issues. He commended ‘home-based fellow Nigerians’ for their 
fortitude in bearing ‘unprecedented hardship, deprivation of every conceivable rights 
and privileges that were once taken for granted.’118 Ostensibly to demonstrate his 
commitment to transitional justice as stated during his candidacy,  President Obasanjo 
established the Oputa Panel on 14 June 2009, barely two weeks after his inauguration in 
1999.  It submitted its report to the Obasanjo administration on 28 May 2002.    
At the inauguration, President Obasanjo declared that it was established to demonstrate 
his administration’s ‘determination to heal the wounds of the past… for complete 
reconciliation based on truth and knowledge of the truth in our land.’119 He went on to 
declare that the government will do ‘everything possible to address all issues that tend 
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to bring our country into dispute, or perpetuate injustice, conflict and the violation of 
human rights.’  
The Oputa Panel was established by Statutory Instrument No.8 of 1999120 under the 
hand of President Obasanjo. The statutory instrument was made pursuant to Tribunals 
of Inquiry Act (TIA).121 The Oputa Panel’s mandate as amended was to: 
a) ascertain or establish the causes, nature and extent of all gross violations of human 
rights committed in Nigeria between the 15th day of  January 1966 and the 28th day 
of May 1996; 
b)  identify the person or persons, authorities institutions or organisations which may 
be held accountable for such gross violations of human rights and determine the 
motives for the violations or abuses, the victims and circumstances thereof and the 
effect on such victims and the society generally; 
c)  determine whether such abuses or violations were the product of deliberate state 
policy or the policy of any of its organs or institutions or whether they arose from 
abuses by state officials of their office or whether they were the acts of any political 
organisation, liberation movement or other groups or individuals; 
d) recommend measures which may be taken whether judicial, administrative, 
legislative or institutional to redress past injustices and to prevent or forestall 
future violations or abuses of human rights; 
e) make any other recommendations which are, in the opinion of the Judicial 
Commission, in the public interest and are necessitated by the evidence; 
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f) receive any legitimate financial or other assistance from whatever source which 
may aid and facilitate the realisation of its objectives. 122       
The Oputa Panel’s remit did not include consideration of the colonial period. In fact, it 
was initially empowered to examine only violations of human rights committed during 
the period from 1 October 1979 (when the incumbent president had handed over to a 
democratic government) to May 28 1999 (when he remerged as an elected President).  
The initial mandate was viewed as limited and was strongly criticised by the human 
rights community, politicians and the public at large for a number of reasons. These 
included the fact the mandate did not cover the period of the civil war and it also 
excluded several periods of military rule including when the new President was also in 
power as military Head of State. Sensing the legitimacy crisis the process will have and 
anxious to be seen as delivering on his commitment to addressing the past, President 
Obasanjo approved the extension of the period to be covered by the process. The 
government later granted Oputa Panel was granted an extended remit that covered the 
whole of the period of military rule from 15 January 1966 (when the first military coup 
took place) to 28 May 1999. Further, the request of the Oputa Panel for the amendment 
to the original terms of reference that restricted its purview to ‘…all known or 
suspected cases of mysterious deaths and assassinations’ was also granted. The 
inclusion of paragraphs (e) and (f) above were also at the request of the Oputa Panel. 
These were with a view to ensuring that it acquired the full-fledged status of a truth and 
reconciliation commission. The amendments were effective from 4 October 1999.123  
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In its report, the Oputa Panel stated that it took the South Africa Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission (South Africa TRC) as its model124 but in practice, there 
were fundamental differences in their structures. The Oputa Panel did not have the 
specialised units provided for by the law establishing the South African TRC. The Oputa 
Panel was not designed for the rehabilitation of victims and it was not granted the 
power of amnesty for truth. However, a notable feature it did share with the South 
Africa TRC is the ‘naming’ of alleged perpetrators of gross violations of human rights. 
Nonetheless, one important feature of the TIA is that it gave the Oputa Panel coercive 
powers to subpoena witnesses and documents. The Oputa Panel also had powers to 
order the arrest of any individual it determined was, or had acted in contempt of the 
Panel. These powers, as will be discussed below, led to contentious litigation against the 
Oputa Panel by former military rulers wary of the accountability process.  
Oputa Panel and the Interpretation of its Mandate 
The Oputa Panel viewed its status as a truth and reconciliation commission. Indeed, 
while addressing the issue of reparation and compensation for victims, it expressly 
referred to itself as a ‘truth commission.’125 It is to be expected that the mandate of any 
commission will be pursued in accordance with the perception or interpretation of the 
mandate by the members. The Oputa Panel viewed its key mandate as achieving 
reconciliation. In the words of the Chairman, ‘Our quo warrant is the search for this 
reconciliation.’126   
                                                      
124 Oputa Panel Report Vol. 1 Chapter 1, 34. 
125 Oputa Panel Report, Volume 6, Chapter 1, 1.  
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Perhaps as a result of the emphasis on reconciliation, the Oputa Panel never invoked its 
power to order the arrest of any witnesses.  The Oputa Panel maintained this position 
even when faced with the defiance of three past military rulers and some of their 
security chiefs to attend on its summons, a development that tested the will, if not the 
credibility of the Oputa Panel in the public eye. It may be the case that the Oputa Panel 
was wary of the power dynamics in the country. There was the reality that President 
Obasanjo was not only known to have been the choice of the military, he also has some 
retired former senior military officers in his cabinet at the time (199-2003) holding 
sensitive positions in the government.127 Notwithstanding Oputa Panel’s emphasis on 
reconciliation, its terms of reference clearly required it to play a pivotal role in achieving 
truth and accountability for victims of gross human rights violations during the decades 
of military authoritarian rule. This aspect of its mandate, in spite of its reconciliation 
approach was not lost on the Oputa Panel as reflected in the summary of its report.128  
The Oputa panel was expected to suggest measures for deterrence of future violations 
and foster restoration of the rule of law which had been violently displaced during the 
years of military dictatorship. This can be discerned from the broad terms of reference 
that mandated the Oputa Panel to ‘recommend measures which may be taken whether 
judicial, administrative, legislative or institutional to redress past injustices and to 
prevent or forestall future violations or abuses of human rights’. In this way, the framers 
of the mandate expected the Oputa Panel to recommend further investigations of 
alleged violations, as well as outright prosecution of alleged perpetrators of criminal 
violations of human rights. It did both, though more of the former than the latter. 
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Expectations were high that the Oputa Panel would contribute extensively to social 
reconstruction in Nigeria. This was reflected in the Oputa Panel’s mandate which urged 
it to ‘make any other recommendations which are, in the opinion of the Judicial 
Commission, in the public interest and are necessitated by the evidence.’ 
The Oputa Panel approached its mandate from a perspective that emphasised a broad 
and flexible conception of its terms of reference. In pursuit of this perspective, the 
Oputa Panel’s recommendations went beyond investigations of alleged violations of 
human rights to setting an agenda for transformation of Nigerian society. An analysis of 
the findings and recommendations of the Panel suggests it was caught between the 
desire to foster reconciliation -between persecutors and the persecuted - and the desire 
to achieve justice for victims of impunity, through recommendations of compensation 
and in some cases, criminal trials. 
The Work and Findings of the Oputa Panel 
The Oputa Panel received over 10,000 petitions within a few months of its 
establishment.129 This is perhaps evidence of the level of rights violations committed 
during the period of military rule. It also points to widespread need of victims for a 
truth-seeking process for securing justice and redress for past human rights abuses. The 
petitions were largely about murder, assassination, attempted assassination, abduction, 
torture, harassment and intimidation, prolonged detention (with or without trial), 
employment related cases as well as contractual and business related cases. However, 
constrained by factors like limited personnel, time and financial resources, the Oputa 
Panel decided to hear only 200 petitions at its public hearings. According to the Oputa 
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Panel, the criteria for hearing the chosen petitions were consideration of the nature of 
the rights involved and the extent or degree of the infringement(s) alleged.130 There was 
thus a great disparity between the petitions submitted to the Oputa Panel and those 
actually heard in public. Still, it heard testimony from some 2,000 witnesses and 
received 1,750 exhibits related to these selected cases.131  
Public Hearings: General, Special and Institutional 
The public hearings were the platform for ventilation of various violations of human 
rights and the misuse of state powers in the years of military rule in Nigeria. The public 
hearings of the Oputa Panel were of two types. There was the general or ‘zonal’ public 
hearing which were held in five notable zonal capitals and the Federal Capital Territory, 
Abuja.132 There were also the special or ‘institutional’ hearings. The sessions of the 
Oputa Panel were held in public between 24 October 2000 and 9 November 2001.133 
There was considerable national coverage of the public hearings by the media. The most 
popular public and private television stations in the country provided daily coverage of 
the public hearings shortly after they began. The public hearings generated intense 
public interest with Nigerians ‘glued to their television sets five nights a week, stunned 
by their country’s sordid past dragged before the Commission.’134 The press coverage 
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was acknowledged and strongly commended by the Chairman as a major contributor to 
the ‘successes of the Panel.’135  
President Obasanjo appeared twice before the Oputa Panel. His first appearance was as 
a victim. He had been convicted and jailed, along with some serving retired military 
officers, for a ‘phantom coup’ in 1995 by the Abacha military regime. He spent three 
years in prison and narrowly escaped being extra-judicially murdered in custody. 
Indeed his erstwhile deputy, General Shehu Musa Yar’ Adua who was also convicted, 
had died in custody following a mysterious injection reportedly administered on him.136 
President Obasanjo was clearly delighted at the opportunity to proclaim his innocence, 
narrate his experience of persecution and challenge some of his persecutors. Obasanjo’s 
second appearance was in response to the summons of the Oputa Panel. He was 
required to respond to allegations of human rights violations during his tenure as 
military Head of State. Some have expressed the view that President Obasanjo did not 
implement the Oputa Panel report due to that second appearance as it had brought to 
the fore the prospect of accountability for human rights violations committed during his 
military regime (1975-1979]. Indeed, he left the hearing in anger.137 In Obe’s view ‘as 
soon as Obasanjo knew that…[his] own [military regime’s human rights violations] is 
inside there as well…not just Sani Abacha, he knew that he was going to kill that thing in 
the water.’138 Notwithstanding his obvious discomfiture on his second appearance, 
Obasanjo’s attendance on that occasion gave impetus to the proceedings of the Oputa 
Panel. 
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Victims of rights violations included the first executive president of the country, Alhaji 
Shehu Shagari. He was the only former leader of the country that heeded Obasanjo’s call 
for former leaders to appear before the Oputa Panel. He ruled the country between 
October 1979 and December 1983.139 This was likely due to the fact his government, 
while notorious for corruption, was not particularly noted for gross violations of human 
rights. The visibility of the Oputa Panel grew with petitions and testimonies of leading 
lawyers, former political officer holders (who fell in the bad books of the military), and 
civil society leaders. Others who came before the Oputa Panel included human rights 
advocates, leaders of workers unions and students, all of whom were active in the 
opposition to military rule.   
According to the Oputa Panel, the causes of human rights violations were neither 
‘simple’ nor ‘straightforward.’140 The violations were allegedly perpetrated by the army, 
the security agencies and the police.141 There were some instances of corporate or 
individual violations of rights too.  
Paragraphs b and c of the terms of reference of the Oputa Panel provided ample basis 
for institutional hearings along with public hearings that focused on individual 
complaints. Thus, there were also ‘special’ hearings organised for civil society, human 
rights groups and specialised professional organisations. The special and institutional 
public hearings featured submissions from the National Human Rights Commission, the 
Armed Forces, the Police, State Security Service, the Nigeria Prisons, about ten civil 
society and human rights organisations and a few individuals.142 The choice of state 
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institutions, with the notable exception of the National Human Rights Commission, may 
have been informed by the popular view that they constitute notorious sources of 
human rights violations. The National Human Rights Commission for its part was set up 
precisely to monitor human rights implementation in various aspects of national life, 
ironically by the Abacha junta noted for its record of gross human rights violations.  
Nonetheless, it did hold hearings on the Police and the Prisons as part of the criminal 
justice system.  The Oputa Panel’s special hearings on the Nigerian Prisons were based 
on submissions made by the Prisons Service and non-governmental organisations. The 
major sources and nature of human rights violations in Nigerian Prisons are succinctly 
articulated in the submission of the Nigerian Prison Service to the Oputa Panel:  
…under the conditions of chronic prison congestion, perennial neglect of the services and 
delay in justice delivery, certain basic rights of prisoners are violated. The right to life and 
integrity of the person, to health and respect for human dignity are largely un-
guaranteed.143 
 
The Nigeria Prisons Service, like many other civil institutions of the Nigerian society, 
suffered serious neglect during the period of military rule.  
Illegal detention was the order of the day. Suspects awaiting trial not only out-
numbered convicts, but many had to wait for over ten years for trial.144 New prisons 
were not built for decades. Yet, there was a phenomenal increase in the number of 
inmates, especially suspects awaiting trial as a result of increased crime rates and delay 
in the trial of accused persons. Detained persons lacked practically every basic necessity 
required for day-to-day living.145 Prison authorities lacked medical facilities and were 
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required to seek leave of the military authorities before obtaining medical attention for 
inmates. On many occasions, inmates died before the required permission was 
obtained.146 In addition, juveniles were lumped with adult detainees and suffered 
similar deprivations.147 The special needs of female detainees were not met. Their 
reproductive rights were violated in addition to the violations suffered by their male 
counterparts. Some female inmates had babies in custody. Some were sexually 
assaulted.148 
In similar vein, the special public hearings on violations of human rights by the Police 
formed an important aspect of the Panel’s work. The Oputa Panel found that there is an 
historical perspective to human rights violations by the Nigerian Police.  The Nigeria 
Police Force, as stated above, was created as an instrument of colonial hegemony. In 
furtherance of the colonial divide and rule system, the recruitment policy was to employ 
individuals to police ethnic groups whose language the policemen did not understand 
and who were in fact historically hostile to the latter’s places of origin as mentioned 
earlier.149 This impacted negatively on police-public relations. The Police had continued 
to act as an imperial force. A careful audit of the petitions on violations of human rights 
by the Police, notably on extra-judicial killings, revealed that most policemen alleged to 
have been involved, were indeed from ethnic groups different from those of victims.  
Further, the incorporation of some police officers by the early military administrations 
into governance, as a matter of political expedience, also played a notable role in police 
violations of human rights. However, the relationship between the military and the 
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Police went awry, with the latter becoming the under-dogs. The Police, as an institution, 
was neglected by successive military regimes, just as its officers were no longer 
included in the distribution of plum political positions. The Police was starved of funds, 
training, promotions and development. In frustration, the Police took vengeance against 
the civil populace.150 Violations of rights by the Police included illegal arrests, detention 
without trial,151 and various forms of torture in the course of investigations to elicit 
‘confessions.’152 Extra-judicial killings of suspects in custody, hapless motorists, 
passengers and pedestrians on the roads, were also common.153 In the course of the 
public hearings, the Oputa Panel found the Police were in the habit of killing people 
unlawfully. In the bid to cover up, they usually alleged such victims were armed 
robbers.154 The Oputa Panel identified several structural factors that predisposed the 
Nigerian Police to gross violations of human rights.155 Notable among them were laws 
which precluded judicial review of executive action, corruption, low qualification 
requirements for enrolment and deficient training. 
The Oputa Panel recognised the limitations arising from its public hearings as a forum 
to ventilate the scale of the gross violations of human rights that had taken place in the 
country in a period covering almost three decades. In order to secure a comprehensive 
picture of the violations, it commissioned research reports by experts. The research 
work by experts was also expected to provide a valuable background of human rights 
violations in the country and thus assist the Oputa Panel to contextualise and facilitate 
its work.  
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Research Reports: Giving Voice to the Voiceless 
Commissioned experts helped it to obtain a fuller picture of the extent of human rights 
violations in the country. Their relatively wider reach than the public hearings of the 
Oputa Panel offered useful insights into the extent of gross violations of human rights 
during the authoritarian period in Nigeria. For purposes of the research, the country 
was divided into geo-political zones. The six zones, North-East, North-Central, North-
West, South-East, South- South and South-West (each comprising six States), have since 
acquired semi-official recognition in the Nigerian polity.  
The North-East and North-West 
The research report on the North-West and the North-East showed that the nature and 
pattern of gross human rights violations in the two zones were similar.156 There were 
common incidence of compulsory acquisition of land from individuals and communities 
by the state and ‘powerful’ individuals, without consultation or compensation. Unlawful 
arrests, detentions and extra-judicial killings by the Police and other security agencies 
of the state constituted the predominant features of rights violations in the two zones.     
Arbitrary dismissal and retirement of workers by government without appropriate 
compensation, discrimination against ‘non-indigenes’- and extortion of peasant farmers 
by traditional rulers were also frequent.157 The Oputa Panel emphasised the need to 
thoroughly investigate the cases to establish ‘who played what role’ and the need to 
either restore illegally acquired land, or ensure payment of adequate compensation.158  
The South-South 
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The South-South zone covers the States of the Niger Delta. As noted above, here lies the 
zone produces the oil that constitutes about 90% of the country’s exports. Yet, it lacked 
basic infrastructure like electricity, health care facilities, potable water, roads and 
sufficient employment opportunities. As noted by the Oputa Panel, ‘it is this paradox 
and apparent tragedy that forms the political economy of human rights violations in the 
area.’159 The nature of gross violations of rights in the area varied from the right to life, 
social rights, cultural rights, to environmental rights. But most human rights violations 
in the Niger Delta involved communities.160  
The research identified multinational oil corporations as one of the major culprits for 
the deplorable state of affairs in the Niger Delta. This is especially with regard to 
ecological devastation and degradation occasioned by their neglect of international 
standards in oil exploration activities.161 Deep-seated feelings of alienation and neglect 
led to the emergence of ethnic and minority groups agitating for the rights of the 
peoples of the area. The response of the Nigerian military-dominated political scene was 
to unleash repression on the leaders and members of such groups. A classic example is 
the environmental degradation of Ogoniland and violation of group rights in the oil 
producing community.162  
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The Oputa Panel concluded that the extent of the crisis and human rights violations in 
the Niger Delta was so profound that it ‘touches on the moral conscience of the Nigerian 
state.’163 Despite the damning situation, researchers confronted apathy from some 
respondents. There was the preference in some quarters to forget the past. The Oputa 
Panel’s researchers also confronted the challenge of bureaucratic responses from 
government agencies and officials and inadequate information in respect of rights 
violations during the Nigerian civil war.164  
The North-Central  
The research conducted on human rights violations in the North-Central zone revealed 
that contestations over traditional institutions and practices, land, resources, systemic 
deprivation and discrimination, feelings of marginalisation (indigene, non-indigene 
dichotomy) and neglect were the major sources of human rights violations. So were the 
excesses of law enforcement agents and partisanship on the part of public office holders 
in the discharge of their duties.165 It emerged that strong attachments to traditional 
institutions and practices were at the root of violent riots and conflict across religious 
and ethnic divides. There were also numerous cases of discrimination against women, 
deprivation of child rights, ethnic and tribal minorities as well as other vulnerable 
groups in various communities in the zone.  
The researchers also found that due to the dearth of civil society and pro-democracy 
groups in the zone (agitating for human rights) in comparison with others, there were 
few cases of state sponsored extra-judicial killings. However, the zone had its ‘fair share’ 
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of ‘state terrorism’ in the number of military officers and civilians executed for alleged 
coup plots.166 Uniquely, one of the States in the zone, Kogi, submitted a memorandum to 
the Panel alleging deliberate neglect and marginalisation by the federal authorities. It 
demanded a ten-year ‘federal equalisation development plan’ to redress the situation.167 
There were many instances of overzealousness and abuse of office by public-office 
holders in the zone too. A curious instance was when the state-ordered arrest of 27 
school children for jubilation at the reported death of General Abacha, the country’s 
most notorious military ruler.168  
The South-West 
In the South-West, the research reviewed 568 cases of human rights violations. The 
research report on the zone relied substantially on data garnered from secondary 
sources. These included media reports, annual reports of official bodies and non-
governmental organisations. It also benefited from informal sessions with some human 
rights organisations. Violations of the right to life and respect for human dignity, 
freedom of expression, social and economic rights all featured prominently in the 
report. Cases of unlawful arrest and detention as well as inhuman treatment, brutality, 
torture (sometimes resulting in death) and extortion were also recorded.  
Extra-judicial killings and alleged state-sponsored, politically motivated assassinations 
were markedly common in the zone from 1984 to1999, the second spell of military rule 
in the country. Such killings were allegedly perpetrated largely by the police and other 
security agencies in the course of official engagements or otherwise. Politically 
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motivated murder was directed at various leading political figures.169 Virtually all such 
cases remain unresolved to date. In some cases, perpetrators have not been identified. 
In others, they have not been prosecuted, despite identification. In yet others, the 
prosecutions have been stalled. Notable in this last category is the trial of some very 
high-ranking military officers for murder and attempted murder of some leading 
political figures in the zone.170 
In the region, renowned for its vibrant media, the Press was also a victim as freedom of 
expression came under severe attack during the long years of military rule.  The 
violations in this regard ranged from arrests and detention of journalists, arraignment 
for serious but unfounded offences, arson attacks on media houses, to proscription of 
publications. Periods of political transition programmes organized by the military 
regimes but subsequently aborted, were particularly traumatic in the South-Western 
region. Most notably, a crisis was engendered by the death of Chief Moshood K.O. Abiola 
in custody in 1998 following the annulment of the presidential election he had won in 
1992.171 On the economic and social fronts, workers were victimised for their 
membership of workers’ unions and some were illegally dismissed. Also, the 
introduction of high school fees, violations of academic freedom, deterioration in 
educational facilities, forceful evictions as well as demolition of homes and shelter of the 
poor without alternative accommodation or compensation, all made the list of 
violations of human rights in the zone. As in some other parts of the country, many 
cases of rights violations were not reported for fear of reprisals. This was also due to 
ignorance, poverty, or sheer apathy.  
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The report on the relatively homogenous South-East zone cited the Nigerian civil war as 
the major ‘backdrop’ for analysing human rights violations in the country in general, 
and the zone in particular. The principal complaints on gross violations of rights in the 
South-East zone were essentially of a group nature. They were either in connection with 
the conduct of the civil war, to which the zone was the theatre, or the aftermath. A 
common complaint was that of marginalisation. It was alleged that the federal 
government actively pursued a programme of exclusion and marginalisation of the zone 
in virtually every aspect of national life and socio-economic development. At the 
individual level, violations of the right to life and fair hearing were reportedly the most 
common. On this score, the complaints followed the pattern in the other five zones of 
the country, principally the South-West. Thus, the report cited a number of cases of 
extra-judicial killings, unlawful arrests and detentions, extortion and labour related 
violations.172 However, the Oputa Panel noted that the research report on the zone 
relied mainly on secondary sources (books and panel of enquiry reports), a fact that 
raised some concerns on its objectivity.173 
Recommendations of the Oputa Panel  
The general tenor of the Oputa Panel’s recommendation was for institutional 
transformation. This was with particular reference to the Prisons, Police, the security 
agencies and the armed forces. Law enforcement and state security services should be 
given a re-orientation to recognise and accord citizens their human rights as a matter of 
course. It called for the introduction of human rights awareness training for the Police 
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and other security agencies. To combat the appalling human rights record of the 
Nigerian Police, the Oputa Panel recommended structural reforms in the nation as a 
whole. As part of the initiative towards institutional transformation, it called on the 
National Assembly to repeal all obnoxious legislation in the country and facilitate law 
reform. It advocated institutional reform of the Police and legislative initiative to 
‘promote police effectiveness, civility and accountability, and reduce police violation of 
human rights.’174  
Disturbed by the spate of deaths in custody, the Oputa Panel recommended the 
establishment of an autonomous inquest system to investigate deaths in custody – this 
recommendation remains unrealised. It proposed the establishment or designation of 
separate detention facilities for persons waiting trial and a powerful autonomous 
monitoring agency to oversight all custodial centres. The Panel called for a viable prison 
decongestion programme and provision of adequate medical facilities in the prisons. It 
concluded that the reformation of the criminal justice system as a whole was the only 
way to secure the rights of detainees.175 The Panel also suggested lustration and 
disbarment from public office, of those found culpable of gross violations of human 
rights.176 The state should take steps to compensate victims of rights violations, and 
investigation and prosecution of culpable officials should be undertaken where 
appropriate. Apart from financial and material reparations, it also recommended that 
government carry out symbolic reparations for victims. These could take the form of 
public holidays and establishment of monuments in recognition of the violations they 
suffered.  
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The Panel specifically recommended the demilitarisation of the South-South zone, 
compensation for victims of rights abuses including families of victims of the civil war 
and review of the regulatory framework for the oil industry. This was in addition to its 
advocacy for a ‘locally driven’ comprehensive plan to develop the zone.177 One of the 
general recommendations of the Oputa Panel was the need to integrate human rights 
education into the academic curricula at all levels of education in the country. It called 
for the promotion of human rights studies to promote inter-ethnic harmony. The Oputa 
Panel also recommended measures to address the imbalance in Ibo representation at all 
levels of national life. This was necessary to assuage feelings of discrimination and 
marginalisation of the Eastern part of the country. 
The Oputa Panel further recommended a re-conceptualisation of what constitutes 
human rights violations in the country. In apparent reference to political and civil rights, 
it criticised what it viewed as an over-emphasis on ‘elitist- driven’ notions of rights like 
freedom of speech, association and so on, on the part of rights advocates and 
activists.178 It called on human rights activists to devote reasonable attention to the 
advocacy and defence of economic, social and cultural rights. The call was important 
considering that social, economic and cultural rights unlike civil and political rights are 
still non-justiciable in Nigeria.   
An important theme that emerged from the public sittings and research reports of the 
Oputa Panel is the allegations of marginalisation by virtually every major or minor 
ethnic group in the country. However, there appears to be some politics to the claims of 
marginalisation. It has been argued by some like Obe, that the Oputa Panel ought to 
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have inquired into the specifics of the claims of marginalisation in light of the various 
dimensions of the phenomenon 
There are different areas of marginalisation…there is the fact of marginalisation 
and there is the perception of marginalisation. In fact, there is also the third 
element, that people say we better also play marginalisation so that whatever is 
claimed for marginalised people can come to us. Let us get our share or whatever 
is reserved for the marginalised.179 
As Abdul Raufu Mustapha has noted in this regard too   
the real problem lies not in the marginalization of this or that group per se, but in the 
inadequate formulation and/or implementation of previous reforms, their politicization, 
and the rising pressures of poverty. 
However, as mentioned above, the report of the Oputa Panel has hardly been subject of 
positive government action. The government at the time attributed its inaction to the 
Supreme Court decision in on a challenge to the powers of the Oputa Panel in the Oputa 
Panel case180 which was instituted by some former heads of State and their security 
chiefs who refused to attend the panel’s public hearings to testify on the Dele Giwa 
petition.. It is important to consider the petition and the case. However, it is relevant to 
consider an important gap in the work of the Oputa Panel which arguably contributed to 
the negative role played by the judiciary in the transitional justice efforts in the country. 
Judicial Accountability: An Important Gap 
The absence of accountability of the judiciary for the past was a marked feature of the 
truth-seeking process in Nigeria as the Oputa Panel did not extend its focus to 
accountability of the judiciary for its role in past governance. This left a major gap in the 
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accountability process for which truth-seeking was instituted. Yet, the rule of law had 
become so severely compromised that Justice Olajide Olatawura whose judicial career 
was largely spent under military authoritarian rule, observed that:                
During the Military regime, the law became weak as a result of ouster and suspensions of 
the constitution and existing laws which gave us liberty and freedom. The constitutional 
duty to protect the liberty and freedom of the citizens by the state was regularly breached 
by those entrusted with that sacred duty…The rights of citizens were not only ignored but 
trampled on.181 
 
The judiciary, as one of those ‘entrusted with that sacred duty,’ was much implicated in, 
and bears some complicity for the violation of human rights and mis-governance in the 
country.  
The Oputa Panel was headed by a retired justice of the Supreme Court and it does 
appear a combination of a traditional view that judicial independence will be 
compromised played a major part in lack of advertence to the judicial role in the years 
of authoritarian rule. The fact that legal professionals dominated the workings of the 
Oputa Panel as they may have struggled to be critical of their own colleagues.182  Still, a 
number of issues call for accountability of the judiciary for its role in governance during 
the authoritarian period. It was a notorious fact that criminal and civil trials (and 
appeals) went on in many cases for years and sometimes decades, a fact that was 
readily acknowledged by the judiciary. The criminal justice administration system, of 
which the judiciary formed an important part, was in shambles. Despite the close 
working relationship between the institutions which were subjects of the special 
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hearings of the Oputa Panel, it did not advert to the need for including the judiciary in 
those hearings. It is important to note that there were obvious references to the judicial 
role by the respective institutions involved in the special hearings.  
It was impossible to discuss the work of the prisons and the police without reference to 
the role of the judiciary in the criminal justice system. In fact, as stated above with 
reference to the Prisons, the hearings revealed that delays in the criminal trial process 
were implicated in the congestion of the prisons. As stated earlier, thousands of citizens 
languished in prisons awaiting trials for years on remand warrants signed by judges. 
Similarly, civil cases took decades in some cases with many dying awaiting justice 
without official acknowledgment or compensation. Fundamentally too, military 
legislation made in violation of due process and human rights were upheld by the 
judiciary. In other words, there was judicial acquiescence to, and legitimation of military 
usurpation of power, constitutional distortions, gross mis-governance and violation of 
human rights.183  
In the circumstances, it was logical to expect that the truth-seeking process, which 
examined what went wrong in the polity, could only be regarded as complete and 
objective if it focused on the judiciary as an important institution of governance during 
the authoritarian period. However, the Oputa Panel scarcely made reference to the role 
of the courts in the violations of human rights in the country. As stated earlier, the 
judiciary is held out as a major reason for the non-implementation of the report of the 
Oputa Panel. The deficit in accountability of the judiciary has continued to haunt the 
judicial function and its attempts at self-redemption in particular, and the post-
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authoritarian governance and democratisation in general.184 It is now apt to return to 
the Dele Giwa petition and the judicial decision which emanated from it with serious 
implications for the truth-seeking process in the country. 
The Dele Giwa Petition 
Dele Giwa was a prominent and fearless investigative journalist, editor and publisher of 
Newswatch, a leading newsmagazine in Lagos. He was allegedly murdered by military 
intelligence through a letter-bomb on the orders of the General Ibrahim Babangida then 
military Head of State, on 19 October 1986. Efforts by his solicitor, Gani Fawehinmi, to 
investigate and prosecute those responsible were frustrated by the military.185 The 
struggle to establish the truth about the murder shifted to the Oputa Panel following its 
inauguration. Fawehinmi submitted a petition against General Babangida and his two 
security chiefs in which he made a case for the matter to be reopened. The Oputa Panel 
issued summons for the appearance of the ex-Military ruler and his two security chiefs 
accused of complicity in the matter but none obeyed. Rather, the trio went to the High 
Court with an ex parte application to restrain the Oputa Panel from summoning them. 
They were similarly supported by two other former military Heads of State, Generals 
Muhammadu Buhari and Abdusalami Abubakar. It is relevant to note that while the 
former is the current Nigerian President (elected into office in 2015), the latter 
midwifed Nigeria’s political transition to civil rule in 1999.  
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In the Oputa Panel Case referred to above the generals sought, among other things, a 
declaration that the President lacked the powers to act under the existing law to 
establish a body like the Oputa Panel for the whole country. They also asked the court to 
stop the Oputa Panel from exercising the power to summon them. They claimed it 
contravened their right to liberty. Meanwhile, a legal team applied to represent the 
generals at the Oputa Panel’s public hearing. That did not go down well with the Oputa 
Panel. Fawehinmi and other counsel also opposed their appearance. The contentious 
issue was whether the Oputa Panel, acting under Section 5 of the TIA, had the power to 
issue and serve summonses on three ex-military rulers. Could a summoned witness who 
failed to appear give evidence by proxy, namely through legal counsel? Whether having 
disobeyed the summons to appear in person, could they be allowed to cross examine 
witnesses of the Oputa Panel? The TIA did not provide for proxy representation of 
witnesses.  
The Oputa Panel decided that personal attendance of the summoned generals was 
required for the proper fulfilment of the Oputa Panel’s mandate.  Specifically, the Panel 
in its ‘ruling’ insisted that witnesses were bound to attend in person in order to be 
entitled to the rights of legal representation, and (cross) examination. Although many 
petitioners or witnesses were represented by counsel, they were in attendance to be 
examined themselves. Justice Oputa emphasised that military officers were not above 
the law. The Oputa Panel also took the position that a proceeding before a commission 
of its nature did not constitute adversarial proceedings. For failing to appear, the Oputa 
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Panel recommended that the generals be deemed to have forfeited their right to govern 
the country in future.186  
In its decision on the Oputa Panel Case, the Supreme Court, constituted by judges who 
had been appointed during the various military regimes, held that the President lacked 
the powers to set up a body like the Oputa Panel with a remit that extended to the whole 
country to enquire into human rights violations. Further, it held that the powers of the 
Panel to summon the Plaintiffs were a violation of their right to liberty. At that point, the 
Oputa Panel had concluded and submitted its work. The decision of the Supreme Court 
placed premium on the rights of the generals to liberty. This was to the detriment of and 
disregard for the wider rights of victims of victims of gross human rights violations to 
truth and acknowledgement of their suffering under the country’s laws and its 
obligations treaty obligations under international law referred to earlier.  
Challenges to the Truth-seeking Process in Nigeria 
The task of truth commissions involves an interrogation of the past and making value 
judgments. This expectedly attracts challenges of various types. In the case of the Oputa 
Panel however, there were some avoidable problems thrown in its way from its 
inception.  
Composition of the Panel 
 As stated earlier, the seven-member panel was headed by Justice  Oputa,  and that from 
the onset gave the panel much credibility amongst a highly sceptical populace as to the 
true intentions of the new government. However, the composition of the panel was 
strongly challenged for being unrepresentative of the heterogeneous nature of the 
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country. Some segments of the country, specifically Muslims in the North and South, felt 
alienated by the constitution of the membership. Oputa was a Catholic from the South 
East and four of the other five members were Christians. Voicing the feelings of the 
northern Muslim elite, Mohammed Haruna, a seasoned journalist, media and public 
affairs commentator, faulted the lopsided composition of the Oputa Panel. He dismissed 
the Oputa Panel as a ‘witch-hunt’. The Panel’s ‘unrepresentative composition,’ Haruna 
argued, was responsible for its highlighting the complaint of some petitioners while 
neglecting others.187  
In a country where more than half the population is Muslim, and where religion is a 
sensitive and divisive issue, the Commission’s composition was problematic. Moreover, 
considering the size of the country, the scope of the mandate and the heterogeneous 
nature of its population, a seven-member panel seemed rather inadequate to effectively 
cover the diverse range of interests and identities in Nigeria. The Nigerian government 
did not pay any serious heed to the concerns expressed about the composition of the 
Oputa Panel. It is important to note that the Oputa Panel, following pre-commencement 
deliberations with civil society groups, specifically requested an increase in the number 
of its Commissioners but this was not implemented.188 No reasons were proffered for 
government’s inaction on the demand. The issue of representativeness of government 
bodies is usually a contentious one in the country. There is much to be said in support of 
ensuring a balanced and representative body to carry out such an important process to 
promote the legitimacy of the process as well as outcome. 
Resource Constraints, Timing and Commencement 
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By comparative standards, the Nigerian truth commission was a modest undertaking, 
yet the Oputa Panel was poorly funded. As such, it took over a year before the Oputa 
Panel began sitting, and at one point it was forced to practically suspend its work 
because of financial difficulties.189 In fact, it was only able to commence work with a 
take-off grant of $400, 000 from the Ford Foundation as the Federal Government failed 
to make any budgetary allocation for it in its first year of operation.190 Haruna argued 
that there was deliberate financial strangulation of the Oputa Panel by the Obasanjo 
administration in order to ensure it became a political weapon in the hands of the 
President against the potential contenders for the presidency in the 2003 elections.  191 It 
did not help matters that the Oputa Panel was not granted its request for specialised 
departments to enable work like its preferred model, the South Africa TRC.  
Largely as a result of the lack of funds, the Oputa Panel was unable to submit its report 
until May 2002; barely ten months before the 2003 elections. At least two notable ex-
military rulers had also openly declared their interest in the presidency. These were 
Generals Buhari and Babangida who had openly contested attempts to have them testify 
before the Oputa Panel as stated earlier. There may therefore be some substance in 
Haruna’s charge that ‘Obasanjo created [the] Oputa [Panel] essentially for politics and 
vengeance.’ 192 It was presumably easy to hold up the possibility of their being dragged 
before the Oputa Panel on allegations of gross violations of human rights as a significant 
deterrent to the two former military heads of state from contesting the presidential 
elections. There was little or no doubt that appearing before the Oputa Panel had strong 
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potentials to put the two ex-military heads of state in bad light in the court of public 
opinion at what was easily the most followed public event in the country’s political 
history. 
A Juridicalised Process 
The Nigerian public seemed to have viewed the Oputa Panel as more of a juridical 
forum, than an unencumbered avenue for investigating the past. This is reflected in the 
fact that so many petitioners, respondents and witnesses, across the board, were 
represented by legal practitioners at the public hearings The ‘crème de la crème’ of the 
Nigerian legal profession attended the proceedings on behalf of clients.  Thirty-three 
Senior Advocates of Nigeria193 are on record to have represented petitioners and 
witnesses at the public hearings. The list included the foremost legal practitioner in the 
country at the time, Chief Frederick Rotimi Williams. Over four hundred lawyers also 
appeared before the Panel. Although a few attended on summons of the Panel (some 
law officers) most appeared on behalf of clients. Even those who took serious exception 
to participating in the public hearings (sections of the elite who felt threatened by the 
truth) ensured appearance by legal proxy. Prominent in that category were the three 
former military Heads of State and some key military security functionaries mentioned 
earlier. The juridicalisation of the truth-seeking process in Nigeria may not be 
unconnected with the composition of the Panel itself. Not only was it headed by one of 
the most respected jurists in the country, almost half of its membership were legal 
practitioners. One of these was a Chief Mudiaga Odje, a leading Senior Advocate of 
Nigeria. 
                                                      
193 The rank of Senior Advocate of Nigeria is the highest rank in the legal profession in Nigeria and the 
equivalent of the British Queen’s Counsel.  
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An overly juridicalisation in appointment to the membership of a truth-seeking process 
fosters a sense of adversarial contestation. This does little to advance the core function 
of the truth-seeking process, a search for the truth. If anything, it detracts from it. In 
recognition of the heavy presence of legal practitioners at the public hearings, lead 
counsel to one of the former military rulers (General Ibrahim Babangida, who defied the 
summons of the Panel thrice over), observed that ‘the atmosphere at the panel was too 
adversarial.’194 This is despite the fact that he did himself appear with a battery of 
lawyers and made a case to cross examine witnesses, while not presenting his client for 
similar purpose.  
The Oputa Panel seems to have also set a tone for subsequent truth-seeking processes 
in the country established by state governments also under respective tribunals of 
inquiries legislation. Indeed, in the case of the Osun Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission (OSTRC) established in 2011 to investigate human rights violations 
committed in the State between 2007 and 2011, six of the seven members were 
members of the legal profession and so was the Secretary. It was headed by a reputable 
retired Justice of the Supreme Court, Samson Odemwingie Uwaifo, as was the Rivers 
State Truth and Reconciliation Commission. The composition of the panels set the tone 
for the juridicalisation of the commissions as they were both considerably adversarial in 
their proceedings.     
Doubtful Legal Basis and Weak International Support 
On the issue of shaky legal foundations of the truth-seeking process, it is relevant to 
point out that Justice Oputa made a demand following the inauguration of the Oputa 
                                                      
194 BBC News:‘Ex-Nigerian Military Ruler Snubs Panel’  (Tuesday 25 September 2001 10:41 GMT 11:41 
UK) available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/1562397.stm ( 19 April 2017) 
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Panel for a tailor-made legislation for the HRVIC but his call went unheeded. It is not 
clear why he back-tracked on the issue and proceeded on what turned out to be a shaky 
foundation for such a crucial engagement. The lesson to be learnt is not to proceed with 
the delicate process of truth-seeking without specific ‘made-to-fit’ legislation. Such 
legislation is required to clearly spell out the powers and limits of the process.  
The Oputa Panel did not generate much international interest. While there may have 
been some international attention in the initial stages of the Oputa Panel, this did not 
translate into positive advantage for the Panel’s work and was certainly not sustained 
during its most crucial stages. For example, the non-implementation of the final report 
and recommendations, including reparations for victims, has hardly attracted 
international censure till date. Likewise, the Oputa Panel received neither the attention 
nor support of the official organs of the United Nations, unlike previous post-conflict or 
post-authoritarian truth-seeking initiatives elsewhere. The exception to this 
international ‘blackout’ was the financial lifeline extended by the Ford Foundation, 
mentioned earlier when funding from the government was not forthcoming. The major 
focus of the international community and the funders was on prioritising and 
supporting the country’s democratic election processes. Thus for instance, the European 
Union, the Carter Centre, the Organisation of African Unity (now African Union), the 
Commonwealth among others, all supported the transition election process but did not 
focus on transitional justice.195 
Although now largely a matter of conjecture, it is quite plausible that international 
attention, monitoring and support for the truth-seeking process in Nigeria may well 
have changed the course of its work. If the international spotlight had been focused on 
                                                      
195 See for instance Observing the 1998-99Nigeria Elections (2  
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the work of the Oputa Panel and its constraints, all arms of government, particularly the 
executive and judiciary, would likely have been more proactive in ensuring the Oputa 
Panel’s success, knowing that it would constitute a litmus test for the commitment and 
sincerity of the Obasanjo regime to democratic values and the rule of law. 
Unfortunately, the important moment of transition now appears irretrievably lost. 
The Aftermath  
A Tool for Legitimising the Obasanjo Government 
 The period of military rule generally and that of the Abacha regime specifically (1993-
1998), led to Nigeria acquiring a pariah status in the international comity of nations.196 
As the Oputa Panel noted in its report  
it is in the struggle against military rule that the more immediate origin of the 
Commission is to be sought, for the democratic struggle kept the issue of arbitrary rule 
and state-sponsored violence…on the agenda of political discourse in the country…the 
transition would be incomplete…if the past was not confronted.197   
 It was clear that Chief Obasanjo was conscious of the hostile domestic and international 
political environment that had developed against military rule in the 1990s. There was 
for instance the country’s suspension from the Commonwealth of Nations in 1995, a 
forum in which she was easily the most important African member. Similarly, Nigeria’s 
international image as a frontline player in the anti-apartheid struggle as well as her 
enviable record of peace-keeping in various parts of the world was virtually in tatters. 
Relevantly too, at a personal level, the newly inaugurated President, Chief Obasanjo had 
acquired a reputation as a leading African statesman. He was co-chair of the inaugural 
                                                      
196 Warris Alli ‘Nigeria’s Foreign Policy of Democratic Transition and Economic Reforms’ in Governance 
and Politics in Post-Military Nigeria : Changes and Challenges Said Adejumobi (ed). Palgrave McMillan. 
145-172.   
197 Oputa Panel Report Volume 1 Chapter 2, 24 
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Commonwealth Eminent Persons’ Group established in 1985 on how to dismantle 
apartheid in South Africa.198 As President he was confronted by the challenge of 
Nigeria’s appalling human rights record which had been considered as being in 
violation of the country’s international human rights obligations by the United 
Nations.199  
With the Oputa Panel in place, the country had a mechanism in place ostensibly geared 
toward recovering justice for victims of decades of gross violations of human rights and 
thereby redeem the country’s name and position in the comity of nations. President 
Obasanjo actively sought and received international welcome in the various parts of the 
world with his ‘shuttle diplomacy’ that formed a major part of his first four-year term of 
office and which facilitated his quest for foreign direct investment (FDI) in the 
country.200 On the domestic plane, the Obasanjo administration was also felt to be 
committed to the pursuit of justice for victims as a measure for reconciling the nation as 
he had promised during his election campaign. At the time, renowned playwright and 
Nobel Laureate, Professor Wole Soyinka – otherwise one of President Obasanjo’s most 
ardent critics – commended him for establishing the Oputa Panel noting that: 
                                                      
198 Commonwealth Network ‘Eminent Persons Group’ available at:  
http://www.commonwealthofnations.org/commonwealth/eminent-persons-group/ (accessed 28 May 
2017). 
199 Human Rights Violations Investigations Commission Report (Oputa Panel Report) Volume 1. Chapter 3, p. 
12. Chapter 6 of the same volume provides concise details of various international human rights over-
sight bodies’ findings and recommendations on flagrant human rights violations in the country (at 21-58).  
See also Economic and Social Council Commission on Human Rights Fifty-third session Items 8 and 10 of 
the provisional agenda E/CN.4/1997/62 (4 February 1997). 
200 Efem N. Ubi, Oluwatooni O. Akinkuotu ‘Nigerian Foreign Policy and Economic Development, 1999–
2013’ (2014) 17 (4) International Area Studies 414-433, 423.  
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Obasanjo has got this one right. Its timing is laudable – human rights commission, truth 
tribunal or whatever it is as we have repeatedly stressed, is the priority of priorities after 
the experience under recent dictatorships.201 
In hindsight, such optimism was misplaced. The early promise by the Nigerian 
government to facilitate justice and reconciliation through a truth commission now 
appears suspect at best.  
President Obasanjo commended the Oputa Panel for its job well done, noting that the 
public hearings had the strong potential to serve as a deterrent to the violations of 
human rights in the country.202 However, till the end of its tenure, the Obasanjo 
administration refused to publish or implement the Oputa Panel Report based on the 
Supreme Court discussed earlier. 
Although the government maintained that it was constrained from taking the Report 
further as a result of the judgement it failed to provide a basis for its decision from any 
part of the judgement. Thus, the premise for the Obasanjo administration’s position 
remained vague and it attracted widespread condemnation. Many groups and 
individuals have made repeated requests for the release and or implementation of the 
Report. The calls for positive action by the government have however been consistently 
ignored. Critics of the government position noted at the time that the Supreme Court did 
not ‘bar’ the government from releasing the Report.203  
There is no unanimity on the effect of the Supreme Court judgement on enforceability of 
the recommendations. While some agree that the decision may have rendered nugatory 
                                                      
201 ‘Righting the Wrongs of the Past: Human Rights Panel Investigates the Past with a View to the Future’ 
A Special International Report Prepared by The Washington Times Advertising Department cited in Yusuf 
2007. 
202 Oputa Panel Report Vol. 2 Chapter 2, 40. 
203 Guardian Editorial, ‘Oputa Panel: Matters Arising,’ The Guardian on Sunday Online Edition (Lagos 19 
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aspects of the recommendations that related to the plaintiffs, they contend that the 
Supreme Court judgement was no excuse to ‘suppress the truth.’  204 Others, including 
the President of the West Africa Bar Association at the time, insisted the Supreme Court 
in fact endorsed the Panel and that its creation was in any case valid under international 
conventions to which the country is party.205 Thus, the government ought to implement 
the recommendations.  
Consequent to the government’s failure to publish the report of the Oputa Panel, some 
civil society groups, including one which consulted for the Oputa Panel, proceeded to 
publish it on the internet.206 Another coalition known as Civil Society Forum published 
the hard copy of ‘The Executive Summary, Recommendations and Conclusions.’ The 
group observed that in all events, the Supreme Court judgement did not bar publication 
of the Report.207 They considered that the people can find other ways of getting the 
recommendations of the Panel implemented, despite the intransigence of government. 
The group also suggested that organising a referendum on them is one such way. This 
informed their determination to ensure the full publication of the Report for mass 
education and action.208 
Governance Gap, Unreformed Institutions and Impunity 
The failure of the Obasanjo administration and the continued silence of it the successor 
administrations on the matter have been telling. Three administrations have been in 
office since Obasanjo left power in 2007. None of them has visited the Oputa Panel 
                                                      
204 K Oderemi ‘Reopen Deaths of MKO, Kudirat, Dele Giwa, Others-Oputa Panel’s Report’ Sunday Punch on 
the Web (Lagos Nigeria Sunday 2 January 2005). 
205 Femi Falana ‘When Will Leaders Pay for their Iniquities?’ This Day (Lagos Nigeria 20 December 2004). 
206 S Olokojobi ‘We’ll Publish Original Oputa Report- Fayemi of CDD’ The Daily Independent (Lagos 
Saturday 11 December 2004). 
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208 Oderemi 2005.  
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Report. Rather, two separate administrations have convened two national conferences 
to discuss the problems bedevilling the Nigerian polity without an articulated reference 
to the need for a focus on implementing transitional justice measures. The main interest 
of the political elite has been the need to ‘restructure’ the country for the devolution of 
power209 without which the country will ‘break’.210 The political elite and government at 
various levels have been remarkably silent on the issue of (non)implementation of the 
report of the Oputa Panel. Still, the non-implementation of the wide-ranging 
recommendations of the Oputa Panel has been viewed as one of the cardinal reasons for 
the continued agitation by some segments of the country on a number of issues. 
Nigerian society continues to pay a heavy price for the failure to adequately implement 
transitional justice. More than a decade and half after the military left power, a myriad 
of conflicts that have since ensued to challenge institutional reform, good governance 
and development in the country. Since 2009, Nigeria has been caught in the grip of 
serious acts of violence; bombings, killings and destruction of property linked to the 
Boko Haram. The north-east Nigeria-based, Islamist insurgent group demands the 
establishment of an ‘Islamic State’ at least in the Northern part of the country as well as 
the unconditional release of its detained members. Some accounts attribute the group’s 
violence to religious fanaticism or Islamic ‘revivalism’; typical of wider international 
narratives of terrorism.211 The official narrative between 2010 and 2015 was that the 
group was set up by forces opposed to the administration then in power. The 
government was led by President Goodluck Jonathan, a Christian from the minority Ijaw 
                                                      
209 Johnson Agbakwuru ‘What Restructuring Means in Practical Terms by ABC Nwosu’ Vanguard (17 July 
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ethnic group from the Southern part of the country. In any event, the situation provides 
ample evidence of the danger inherent in neglecting to address the impunity that was 
the defining feature and legacy of the colonial and authoritarian period. This is 
especially the case with violations of economic and social rights which have left vast 
numbers of the population pauperised and vulnerable to manipulation of a few who are 
able to mobilise sections of the society under the guise of ethnicity or warped religious 
ideology.212 
The Boko Haram insurgency also brought to the fore how the handling of security issues 
has hardly been intelligence led, but rather militarised, dating back to the military era. 
In 2012, Bukar Abba Ibrahim, a Senator (and former Governor of Yobe State) 
representing parts of the epicentre of the Boko Haram insurgency, denounced security 
agencies for killing more people than the Boko Haram and making matters worse for the 
people, contrary to official claims. He noted that Boko Haram had existed for ‘ages’ as a 
peaceful group but the impunity of the security agencies, particularly the police, 
provoked it to violence against the state. He lamented that whenever a soldier was 
harmed in any way, the army responded by cordoning off such an area and burning 
down all property there. ‘What,’ he wondered ‘has [burning] property got to do with 
people killing security agents on the road?’213    
Beyond adroit lip-service, little by way of substantial institutional reform of policing has 
taken place in Nigeria in the post-colonial period. Policing arrangements are such that 
despite the large population running into an estimated 150 million people, there is only 
                                                      
212 See Hakeem O. Yusuf ‘Harvests of Violence - Neglect of Basic Rights and the Boko Haram Insurgency’ 
(2013) 6 (3) Critical Studies on Terrorism 371 – 391; Olabanji Akinnola ‘Boko Haram Insurgency in 
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one federally-controlled police force in the country. Calls for State control and 
community policing to enhance effectiveness and legitimacy of the police have remained 
largely ignored for decades. Policemen are still accommodated in barracks, a 
continuation of a colonial practice to ensure they could be promptly deployed to quell 
any resistance to the colonial government.214  
CURRENT CONTEXT: CHALLENGES TO TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE  
Transitional justice has more or less hit a road-block in Nigeria. On the one hand the 
country has been in ‘safe’ pairs of hands. As Ogbara noted, 
the military deliberately handpicked some of their own men to handle key offices…apart 
from Obasanjo; the Senate Presidency was occupied by General David Mark [rtd] for 
eight good years. How do you expect the Constitution will be amended to accommodate 
fundamental rights for Nigerians?215 
 On the other hand, civil society has been largely fragmented and disconnected from the 
people. Civil society efforts to hold government to account after the political transition 
in 1999 has diminished compared to the experience during military rule. As Akiyode-
Afolabi noted ‘…a lot of things are happening and people are not talking about it because 
there is generally some kind of fatigue.’216 
However, calls for justice for the past has not ceased in the country. Calls for the 
implementation of the recommendations of the Oputa Panel have been ongoing though 
this has not been organised in any systematic form. For instance, victims of the alleged 
1995 coup who had variously suffered torture, premature and unjust dismissal from 
military service had all been hopeful that President Obasanjo’s personal experience 
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would galvanize him into action for securing justice for other victims of that alleged 
coup and similar others. They have remained sorely disappointed at his subsequent 
inaction.217 Expressing disappointment with the subsequent lack of implementation of 
the Oputa Panel’s recommendations regarding the 1995 phantom coup, one of the 
victims recently stated in an interview: 
I am appealing to the Federal Government to implement the recommendations of the 
Oputa Panel. We need to reach some form of closure on this matter. They must realise that 
what goes around comes around. 218  
 There have been some calls by individual victims and public commentators for the 
implementation of the report of the Oputa Panel. However, a concerted, streamlined, 
and organized platform for such demands has not emerged. This remains a significant 
challenge in the transitional project in the country. The civil war ended on the note of 
‘unity’, namely that the secession bid was quashed and the country kept as one. As 
noted above, the military leadership generally rejected calls for accountability for its 
nearly three decades in power. The rejection was pursued through the courts and 
ostensibly sealed through a judicial process. Nonetheless, there is a political narrative of 
nationalistic patriotism advanced by the military on its role in the country that is 
strategically marshalled against the articulation or pursuit of any accountability agenda 
for its conduct while it was in power. The core of the narrative is that of its historical, 
‘patriotic’ role of keeping the country together during the civil war. The narrative is to 
the effect that the military perpetually deserves the nation’s gratitude for preserving the 
territorial integrity and unity of the country and the debt of gratitude owed to the 
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military for this service trumps any wrongdoing on its part, including impunity, large-
scale corruption and gross violations of human rights. 
Gate-Keeper Politics, Nepotism and Corruption 
The legacy of authoritarian rule connects closely with the colonial past. Both are 
marked by violence and exploitation and constitute major factors in the failed project of 
transitional justice in Nigeria. Former military rulers have been conscious gate-keepers 
of their legacy of political misrule, grand corruption, gross violations of human rights 
and impunity. They remain keen to ensure only one of their numbers or designated 
candidates can be trusted to hold the reins of political power where it matters most. 
Consider in this regard that Nigeria has had four presidents in the period of transition to 
civil democratic governance. Two have been former military Heads of State, Olusegun 
Obasanjo (1999-2007) and Muhammadu Buhari (2015- ). Obasanjo openly imposed the 
two others on the ruling party at the time; late Musa Yar’Adua (2007-2009) and 
Goodluck Jonathan (2009-2015). Thus, as indicated above, the post-authoritarian 
period in the country has had either a former military ruler or his designated candidate 
as the elected executive president of Nigeria. It is important to bear in mind that Nigeria 
is a federal state, modelled after the USA’s presidential system. In a country where the 
President has wider constitutional powers than the American President, that is a critical 
issue for any attempt at social transformation. This has meant that the military, despite 
‘ceding’ power, continue to influence democratic politics and thus there has been little 
appetite for thorough transitional justice.  
The ploy to keep accountability for impunity perpetrated by previous military regimes 
has been particularly focused (extensively but not only) at the federal level. Especially 
in the first elections after military rule, erstwhile military rulers (governors, ministers 
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and heads of strategic public institutions) contested and won elections as state 
governors and members of the federal parliament. Rich, retired senior military officers 
who had held political office played active and usually leading roles in supporting and 
sponsoring candidates for elections. A former military governor and minister was 
Senate President for eight years and is still a member of the Senate.219 In the 
circumstances, it is easy to understand how the ‘transition moment’ was lost and the 
appetite for revisiting the past has become unremarkable despite its deleterious effect 
on the present.  
The control of the country by the military extends beyond regular, formal institutions of 
government. Traditional rulership remains relevant in governance and power 
configurations with varying levels of importance in the country, the military have also 
kept an eye out to secure its power-interests. Thus for instance, several military officers, 
including former generals who had held key service positions, governorship and 
ministerial positions during military rule retired to take up important traditional ruler-
ship in the Northern part of the country.  This is particularly significant for two reasons. 
First, as indicated earlier, former military officers have emerged as traditional rulers in 
some of the most important traditional ruler-ship positions including the two highest 
positions in the historically significant Sokoto Caliphate (Sultan of Sokoto and Emir of 
Gwandu).220 In other situations where non-military officers have emerged, powerful 
military officers have been ‘powers behind the throne’ playing decisive roles in the 
choice of who is appointed as traditional rulers. Second, it is relevant to note that in the 
                                                      
219 Eighteen years on at the time of writing in 2017. 
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Northern part of the country especially, the traditional political institution remains both 
an integral part of formal state structures of governance unlike other parts of the 
country and, like other parts of the country, also exerts an informal but equally 
influential power over the people in their respective domains. Thus, holding office at 
that level provides a significant source of power that can be, and indeed is used, to 
maintain a status quo of impunity.  
Nepotism has also been a mechanism for maintaining a status quo of unaccountability 
for gross violations of human rights. A former military administrator became a State 
Governor as did a former Chief of Naval Staff. The son of the latter was recently elected 
into the federal Senate. Some military apologists, contractors, business acolytes or 
relations of former military officers who had held public office, contested and won 
elections. This was an important feature of the first decade of the post-authoritarian 
political transition and remains the case to varying extents. The son-in-law of a former 
military head of state is currently a governor of their state in the northern part of the 
country. Another ex-Head of State’s son-in-law was governor in a State in the North for 
eight years. Even the judiciary is not immune from the influence of the military. Quite 
apart from the fact that many judges appointed by the military across the hierarchy of 
the State and federal judiciary (including its highest levels) remain on the bench, some 
are family members and close relations of former military rulers. For example, the wife 
of a former head of state only recently retired as a Chief Judge of a State and a wife of 
the former Chief of Naval Staff mentioned earlier is a judge of the federal high court.  
Corruption is another important factor impeding transitional justice in the country as 
recent investigations into the handling of the Boko Haram insurgency demonstrates. 
Security issues have been exploited as a major source for grand corruption of sometime 
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mind-boggling proportions. This has become evident from the revelations that have 
since emerged following investigations by the Buhari administration into the activities 
of the office of the National Security Adviser (NSA) as well as the handling of the 
military budget of the Jonathan administration (2010-2015).221 It has emerged that the 
office of the NSA was allegedly used as a conduit for sharing out huge sums of money 
running into over $15 billion dollars for the 2014/15 re-election campaign of President 
Jonathan.222 Simultaneously, the heads of the army, the navy and the air-force were also 
allegedly engrossed in embezzling millions of dollars throughout the period the country 
was facing the Boko Haram insurgency in the Northern part of the country. Funds for 
the payments of troops and procurement of arms and ammunitions were being diverted 
into the accounts of military chiefs.223  
Meanwhile, thousands of troops mutinied for lack of weapons and non-payment of 
salaries and, or allowances in the ‘war’ against Boko Haram insurgents. Many of such 
troops were arrested, court-martialled, convicted, some sentenced to death and many 
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jailed.224 In similar vein, in April 2017, the Secretary to the incumbent Federal 
Government of President Muhammadu Buhari was suspended and eventually dismissed 
from office following allegations of corrupt enrichment through the awards of shady 
contracts running into millions of dollars from the funds of the Presidential Initiative on 
North East (PINE). PINE is a government initiative to coordinate the government’s 
programme for addressing the humanitarian crisis generated by the Boko Haram 
insurgency.225 Further, institutional moves to bring development to the restive Niger 
Delta have also been ‘hobbled’ by corruption ranging from the Presidential Amnesty 
Programme: established to grant amnesty to and rehabilitate former militants; the 
interventionist Niger Delta Development Commission: established to facilitate rapid 
infrastructural development in the short term to the region; to the Ministry of the Niger 
Delta established to bring focused, long term development to the region, the experience 
has been that of monumental corruption by officials at virtually every level of the 
various bodies.226  
The foregoing initiatives indicate the government is beginning to re-direct attention to 
the need for transitional justice in the country. Significantly, the Buhari administration 
has begun to demonstrate the need for substantive transitional justice measures for 
victims of the Boko Haram insurgency, the Niger Delta and some victims of the civil war. 
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In November 2017, the legislature passed legislation creating the North East 
Development. 227 This is to ensure government commits to the reconstruction of 
infrastructure in the North East devastated by the Boko Haram insurgency. Further, 
sequel to case brought by some victims of the civil war before the court of the Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS Court), the Nigerian government agreed to 
pay victims N88 billion. In a consent judgment, the government is to pay the N50 billion 
to the victims across eleven states in the south east, south-south and north central 
zones of the country. The government will pay N38 billion to two companies appointed 
and designated by the victims to rid the war-affected areas of bombs and explosives 
which have continued to constitute a danger in various public and private places 
including places of worship, schools and farms. Significantly too, the companies are 
expected to carry out certain specified construction works. In addition, the government 
is to establish a National Mine Action Centre for victims to be located in the South 
eastern part of the country.228 These developments are coming at a time the 
government also approved the payment of long withheld pensions to military, 
paramilitary and police men and officers who crossed over to fight on the Biafran side 
during the civil war.229 The pensions had remained unpaid for47 years. These are all 
only at their commencement or declarative stages. It remains to be seen how victim-
focused they would be and there remains a big question mark on institutional reforms 
for forestalling impunity. 
Conclusion  
                                                      
227 Levinus Nwabughiogu ‘How We Conceived, Processed, Passed NEDC — Speaker Dogara’ Vanguard 
Newspaper (Lagos 6 November2017); ‘Interview: North-East Leaders will Carry the Shame Forever if 
NEDC is Mismanaged – Dogara’ Premium Times (Abuja 2 November 2017). 
228 ‘FG Agrees to Pay N88bn Compensation to Victims of Biafra War’ Vanguard Newspaper (Lagos 30 
October 2017). 
229 Queen Esther Iroanusi ‘Nigerian Govt to Commence Pension Payment of Biafran Veterans’ Premium 
Times (Abuja 18 October 2017). 
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The transitional justice approach in Nigeria has been to preserve the existing structures 
of power which sustains the status quo of dominance for the local elite that took over 
political and economic control in the country. Truth-telling, trials, lustration, 
acknowledgment or any other measures that deliver justice for victims or institutional 
reforms is conceived as a threat to the power of the local elite. As a result, the 
engagement with transitional justice measures by the local elite has been on protecting 
their privileges and powers and substantively, little else. A combination of factors; 
including poor planning, lack of sincerity on the part of the government and absence of 
political will, played out to frustrate transitional justice efforts in the country. Also, it 
did not help matters that transitional justice was absent from the international 
community’s engagement with Nigeria’s political transition process with the interest 
focused essential on democratisation. 
The implementation of transitional justice in the post-authoritarian/military era in 
Nigeria has largely been a failure. Even the symbolic trials, commenced soon after the 
political transition, became moribund due to political and technical factors. The 
lustration measure that was implemented has at best produced a crop of very powerful 
ex-military officers. The group emerged as key political players in the transition to civil 
governance with largely ill-gotten wealth secured from years of authoritarian rule. The 
lustration process was only directed at disengaging this crop of officers from active 
military service and nothing else. Since they were not barred from seeking elective 
office, they have emerged as a strong force on the political front. Benefitting from their 
deep-pockets, they have assumed key elective positions or sponsored candidates for 
elections to protect their interests.  
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Worse still, the major mechanism for obtaining accountability and justice for victims of 
impunity—the truth-telling process—was frustrated by a combination of dynamics. The 
most prominent of the dynamics is the deficiency of sincerity on the part of the 
initiating regime. As a process, the truth-telling mechanism did a commendable job of 
seeking to establish the truth about the course of executive and legislative governance 
in the authoritarian period. It assisted the bid to legitimise the post-authoritarian 
civilian administration, but the value of its well-received work remains questionable.  
The search for justice, truth and reconciliation through the Oputa Panel suffered a 
fundamental setback in its lack of tailor-made legislation. Such legislation would have 
made provisions for its functions as a truth commission for the whole country with the 
power to summon witnesses as required. Further, the law would have specified the duty 
of the government to cooperate with the truth commission and respect Nigeria’s 
obligations under international law. 
The search for truth and reconciliation in Nigeria through the Oputa Panel suffered a 
fundamental set back in its lack of tailor-made legislation. One of the crucial issues that 
ought to be addressed by such legislation, as the legal challenge to the Oputa Panel 
showed, is the jurisdictional scope of the process within a federal polity like Nigeria. The 
incident of power-sharing between the central and state governments dictated the need 
for legislation that validly defined the scope of the powers of a truth commission.  It is 
relevant to note in this respect for instance, that state governments had powers similar 
to that of the president to establish a commission along the lines of the Oputa Panel in 
their states under various (though similar) Tribunals of Inquiry Laws.  Indeed, both 
Rivers and Osun States (in the South-South and South-West regions) of the country 
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respectively, established truth commissions following periods of political violence and 
human rights violations.  
There is a widely-held view that the transition to democracy has failed to deliver on 
justice and restoration of the rule of law. Rather, impunity and state-sponsored violence 
have remained unchecked, if not increased, in the country. A militarised psyche has 
taken hold in the polity and reflects also in the attitude of political office holders who 
flout court orders with impunity. Hopes for a new dawn in the wake of the transition 
have gone largely unfulfilled. The Nigerian government, in jettisoning the Oputa Panel 
Report with its wide-ranging recommendations for accountability and institutional 
reforms, has contributed significantly to the current state of affairs. Nonetheless, there 
are those who hold the optimistic view that the report of the Oputa Panel will provide a 
solid basis of action for a future government with political will to implement its 
recommendations. As Akinnola stated in this regard, ‘some people will still have to face 
the music over some of the things that happened. There’s no way they can run away. We 
will get the government that has the will power to implement some of these 
recommendations.’230 
                                                      
230 Interview with Richard Akinnola 2017.  
